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Abstract 
How do people detect whether someone else poses an infection risk? Over the course of 
evolutionary time, humans evolved sophisticated physical and psychological machinery for 
detecting and reducing fitness costs associated with infectious pathogens. Whereas the physical 
immune system evolved to detect invasive pathogens within the body and eliminate them, the 
“behavioral immune system” evolved to detect infection risks outside the body and engage 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral mechanisms that serve to prevent infectious pathogens from 
entering the body in the first place. My dissertation research focuses on the psychological 
mechanisms that enable people to detect infection risks. Importantly, such mechanisms entail a 
sort of functional misperception of infection risks: given uncertainty in detecting infection and 
asymmetrical costs associated with false positive and false negative errors, the behavioral 
immune system perceives both objectively diagnostic infection cues as well as physically 
anomalous yet benign cues as indicators of infection risk. In other words, in order to avoid the 
high cost of ignoring a true infection risk, the behavioral immune system is biased to perceive 
infection risk in anomalous cues, even ones that are objectively benign. After I review this 
hypothesis and its empirical tests in Chapter 1, in Chapters 2 and 3 I report two series of 
studies—one series per chapter— designed to discover novel psychological mechanisms of the 
behavioral immune system. In Chapter 2, I employ the Implicit Association Test to explore 
whether people associate infection more strongly with one benign, anomalous cue (facial 
disfigurement) than with another (obesity). Across four studies, I find evidence that it does. 
Then, in Chapter 3, I employ trait-listing, drawing, and reverse correlation methods to estimate 
  xv 
how people mentally represent infected others. I find that people list traits and draw pictures of 
infected people with mostly infection cues. But when people complete a reverse correlation task, 
they generate infected people with a mixture of threat cues. I conclude my dissertation with 
future directions for behavioral immune system research. 
Keywords: behavioral immune system, threat management, evolutionary psychology, social 
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Introduction 
Infectious disease has been a recurring source of mortality throughout our evolutionary 
history, and even to this day, it continues to threaten lives across the world, especially the lives 
of young children and older adults in poor countries. So, it is not surprising that humans have, 
over evolutionary time, developed sophisticated physical machinery—an immune system—for 
identifying invasive pathogens and eliminating them. Of course, the immune system costs 
valuable energy, so completely ignoring harmful pathogens until they enter the body wastes 
energy that could be used for other fitness-enhancing activities. To reduce such costs, humans 
have likely developed psychological and behavioral mechanisms—a behavioral immune 
system—for identifying and mitigating pathogen infection risks. 
In my dissertation, I focus on how such a behavioral immune system identifies infection 
risks posed by other people. In chapter one, I start by reviewing key assumptions of the 
behavioral immune system as well as empirical research on how it infers whether others pose an 
infection risk. In the following chapters, I elaborate on the social-cognitive mechanisms that aid 
in detecting infection risks posed by others, and I report studies designed to test some of those 
mechanisms. Specifically, in chapter two, I elaborate on the kinds of cues the behavioral immune 
system evolved to process—its proper domain of cues—and the kinds of cues it is able to 
process, even if it did not evolve to do so—its actual domain of cues. Then I report a series of 
studies designed to test whether people more strongly associate infection concepts with cues that 
resemble theoretically proper domain cues (e.g., rashes) than with cues that less closely resemble 
such proper domain cues (e.g., obesity). Finally, in chapter three, I elaborate on how people may 
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generate mental images of infected others that appear differently from a simple sum of 
theoretical infection cues (i.e., rashes + pustules + asymmetry + swelling + runny nose) or from 
an indiscriminately negative person. Then I report a series of studies designed to estimate how 
people mentally represent what an infectious person looks like. Finally, I conclude my 
dissertation with recommendations for future research that could address open questions in the 
pathogen avoidance psychology literature as well as the threat management literature more 
broadly. 
 
  3 
Chapter I. The Behavioral Immune System  
The specter of disease caused by infectious pathogens has imposed an immense selection 
pressure on the evolution of life for billions of years. Human life is no exception. In fact, most 
human lives have ended at the hands of pathogenic infections, and new infections continue to 
cause many millions of deaths worldwide (Anderson & May, 1992; Dobson & Carper, 1996; 
Wolfe et al., 2007; World Health Organization, 2018). To combat this ominous threat posed by 
infectious pathogens, humans have evolved a physiological immune system designed to 
distinguish invading pathogens from the body’s own cells and mobilize physiological defenses to 
reduce infection. They also appear to have evolved a “behavioral immune system,” a suite of 
psychological and behavioral mechanisms designed to detect the presence of pathogens and 
engage appropriate cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to avoid them (Ackerman et 
al., 2018; Curtis et al., 2004; Oaten et al., 2009; Schaller, 2016; Tybur et al., 2013; Tybur & 
Lieberman, 2016). 
 The behavioral immune system cannot detect infectious pathogens directly. Instead, it 
infers their presence using cues that historically have correlated with pathogenic infection. These 
cues are often noticeable in appearance, as infection can cause rashes, lesions, discoloration, 
swelling, bleeding, and/or nasal discharge, among other physical changes. Of course, physical 
features also may resemble these cues without connoting the presence of infection. For example, 
rashes may occur due to skin irritation, or noses may run because of cold ambient temperatures. 
The similarity between true and false infection cues, in combination with the imperceptibility of 
pathogenic agents, produces a signal detection problem in which identification errors are 
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virtually certain. Further, the costs of different forms of error are unequal. Failure to identify a 
dangerous pathogen’s presence (e.g., mistaking swelling from deadly Diphtheria as benign) is far 
costlier to fitness than mistakenly inferring a parasitic threat that is not there (e.g., mistaking a 
birthmark as an infectious rash). To cut through the noise, selection appears to have favored a 
cognitive bias that reduces fitness costs by over-perceiving pathogen threat from imperfect cues 
(Haselton et al., 2015; Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; McKay & Efferson, 
2010; Nesse, 2005). 
 Researchers who study pathogen avoidance psychology have used this adaptive over-
perception to partly explain stigma directed toward people with anomalous yet benign facial 
features such as obesity, port-wine stain birthmarks, strabismus (i.e., crossed-eyes), old age, and 
physical disabilities (Ackerman et al., 2009; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Lieberman et al., 2012; 
Miller & Maner, 2012; Park et al., 2003; Ryan et al., 2012; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; van 
Leeuwen et al., 2015). To understand the behavioral immune system’s tendency to perceive 
infection in non-infectious features, researchers in this area assume that the behavioral immune 
system is a functional module of the mind—it comprises cognitive mechanisms with specialized 
functions with restricted inputs (Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Schaller, 2016; Sperber, 
1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). In the context of pathogen threat, the function of the 
behavioral immune system is to process inputs reflecting true signs of infection (constituting the 
“proper” domain for this system). Yet, because of the signal detection problem described above, 
the design elements of this system also process cues that share perceptual properties with cues 
from the proper domain. The combined set of these cues constitute the actual domain of the 
behavioral immune system. So, theoretically, the behavioral immune system should react to true 
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infection cues as well as false infection cues if such false infection cues share perceptual 
properties of true infection cues. 
 Researchers have tested this over-perception hypothesis using a variety of methods. For 
example, in one analysis, Ackerman et al. (2009) found that people participating in a dot-probe 
task who were psychologically primed with pathogen threat looked longer at faces with benign 
birthmarks or crossed-eyes than at faces without those features. This suggests people were 
attending more to anomalous yet benign facial features when pathogen infection was salient as if 
those features indicated infection risk. In another study, people expressed more disgust in 
response to, and were less willing to touch, objects that had been touched by people with visible 
cues of influenza compared to the same objects that had been touched by visibly healthy targets 
(Ryan et al., 2012). People also expressed more disgust by and less willingness to touch those 
objects when the target people bore non-infectious facial blotches, suggesting participants 
perceived features that merely resembled infection cues as if they were true indicators; that 
perception made them avoid touching objects that had been “contaminated” through physical 
contact. As a third and final example, people for whom pathogen threat was salient recorded 
stronger automatic negative associations with obese targets than people in a control condition 
(Park et al., 2007) and people who reported higher concerns about or disgust from pathogenic 
objects (e.g., feces, bloody cuts, chewed pencils) tended to report stronger negative attitudes 
toward obese people (Lieberman et al., 2012; Park et al., 2007). All together, these results 
support the hypothesis that people misperceive infection risk in benign features that share 
perceptual properties with true infection indicators (e.g., rashes, swelling). 
 Researchers have extended this over-perception hypothesis to include cues that less 
plausibly resemble true infection indicators but nonetheless could be associated with harmful 
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pathogens. The most prominent example is foreign appearance perceived in ethnic outgroups. A 
sizeable body of evidence suggests people under pathogen threat—either people high in 
pathogen threat concern or people exposed to pathogenic materials in a laboratory—report 
stronger negative attitudes toward ethnic outgroups (i.e., anti-immigrant attitudes) (Aarøe et al., 
2017; Faulkner et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2011; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Schaller & Neuberg, 
2012). The standard explanation is that individuals from ethnic outgroups may harbor pathogens 
that individuals from the ingroup have not developed immunity against, so cues such as skin 
color and other physical features associated with such ethnic outgroups may elicit psychological 
responses and behaviors that at least indirectly limit exposure to individuals from these groups 
(e.g., negative attitudes, prejudice, hostility, avoidance). van Leeuwen and Petersen (2018) called 
this the “adaptation-for-outgroups” account because it holds that the behavioral immune system 
was designed to process foreign appearance as an infection cue (i.e., a proper domain cue) given 
the costs of foreign pathogens. Alternatively, the behavioral immune system may include design 
features for learning and transmitting information about avoiding pathogens, which could include 
stereotypes and experiences linking ethnic outgroups with infection (Fessler et al., 2015). In this 
way, the behavioral immune system could incorporate associations between ethnic outgroup cues 
and pathogens in order to mitigate infection risks (real or perceived), even if the behavioral 
immune system is not designed specifically to motivate avoidance of such groups (van Leeuwen 
& Petersen, 2018). 
 In sum, a diverse body of research has been motivated by the hypothesis that the 
behavioral immune system evolved to motivate the avoidance of people who display correlates 
of infectious disease. Importantly, given uncertainty inherent in detecting infection from 
imperfect cues and the asymmetric costs of mistakes, the behavioral immune system responds to 
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true infection indicators (proper domain cues) as well as cues that share perceptual properties of 
such indicators (actual domain cues). Such a sensitive system may help people effectively avoid 
infectious others, but it may also underlie unfounded prejudices toward people bearing 
anomalous yet objectively benign physical features (e.g., port-wine stain birthmarks, obesity, 
foreign appearance). That is, over-perception can be functional yet problematic. 
 My dissertation work expands on this over-perception hypothesis. The assumptions and 
empirical research reviewed in chapter one serve as a foundation for chapters two and three. In 
chapter two, I elaborate on why I should expect the behavioral immune system to treat some 
infection cues as stronger indicators of infection risk than others. If one cue better diagnoses 
infection risk or perhaps better diagnoses a more fitness-costly infection risk than another cue 
(e.g., a deadly or debilitating infection), then I should expect the behavioral immune system to 
react more strongly to that cue and any cue that shares many perceptual features with the 
strongly diagnostic cue. In three studies, I test this hypothesis by comparing the strength of 
association between infection concepts and obesity to the association between infection concepts 
and facial disfigurement. 
 In chapter three, I elaborate on why I should expect people to mentally represent infected 
others and I employ three mental representation methods to explore two hypotheses about how 
they might do that: the threat-specificity hypothesis and the threat-combination hypothesis. The 
threat-specificity hypothesis posits that people mentally represent infected others only with 
features that diagnose infection risk. Based on the behavioral immune system literature, these 
features include but are not limited to germiness, disfigurement, obesity, old-age, and 
foreignness. Importantly, based on the threat-specificity hypothesis, other threatening features 
like anger, dominance, violence, and muscularity should not appear in mental representations of 
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infected others. In contrast, the threat-combination hypothesis posits that people mentally 
represent infected others with a combination of threatening features, such as disfigurement as 
well as anger. Together, chapters two and three shed light on basic and unexplored mechanisms 
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Chapter II. Differences in Infection Cue Strength 
 
 As I discussed in more detail in chapter one, researchers who study pathogen avoidance 
psychology assume the behavioral immune system is a functional mental module: it comprises 
cognitive mechanisms with specialized functions and restricted inputs. This means that, for the 
behavioral immune system, pathogen threat-specific cues elicit psychological responses and 
behaviors whose functions serve to reduce pathogen threats. Pathogen threat-specific cues 
comprise true indicators of infection—the “proper” domain of the behavioral immune system—
as well as cues that share perceptual properties with those true indicators. The set of proper 
domain cues that the behavioral immune system was designed to process plus the cues the 
system is able to process as a by-product of its design make up the “actual” domain of the 
behavioral immune system. Theoretically, all cues that make up the actual domain of the 
behavioral immune system should elicit psychological responses and behaviors that function to 
reduce pathogen threats.  
 A growing body of evidence suggests that a variety of anomalous cues—whether or not 
they truly indicate infection—elicit psychological response and behaviors that serve to reduce 
pathogen threats. That is, cues like rashes, runny noses, facial discoloration, wrinkles, crossed-
eyes, swelling, obesity, and physical disability—among other anomalous cues—elicit visual 
attention, disgust, prejudice, and avoidance, psychologies and behaviors which can all play a role 
in reducing infection risk. Though these findings provide evidence for an effect of anomalous 
cues on behavioral immune responses, it is at least unclear from current theory whether the 
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behavioral immune system should treat these cues and other benign, anomalous cues as equally 
indicative of infection risk. One might expect this system to discriminate between anomalous, 
benign facial features (e.g., more looking, disgust, avoidance) if some benign features closely 
resemble highly diagnostic symptoms more than others. On the one hand, if some features are 
highly diagnostic—they strongly distinguish between infected and non-infected individuals—
then those features warrant uninhibited behavioral immune responses. For example, facial rashes 
are associated with a large variety of fitness reducing infections (e.g., Drage, 1999). On the other 
hand, if some features are poorly diagnostic, the behavioral immune system could mute its 
responses to them so people can explore fitness enhancing social interactions with people 
presenting with such features. For example, obesity has been linked to some infections and might 
weaken the efficacy of vaccines (Coetzee et al., 2009; Falagas & Kompoti, 2006; Mancuso, 
2013; Whigham et al., 2006), but many more people meet criteria for obesity but harbor no 
infection. Moreover, obesity is a relatively modern physical anomaly that may not be under 
strong selection pressure (Pontzer et al., 2012), making it susceptible to over perception from the 
behavioral immune system. Such a poorly diagnostic infection cue must be interpreted in the 
context of other cues that diagnose beneficial social opportunities. 
If rashes diagnose infection but obesity does not, then rashes fall within the proper 
domain of the behavioral immune system and obesity does not, and people might react with 
stronger behavioral immune responses to proper domain cues like rashes than to actual (but not 
proper) domain cues like obesity possibly because the behavioral immune system can more 
easily process inputs it was designed to process (Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Kurzban, 2006). 
Moreover, if benign facial disfigurements strongly resemble rashes, then, even though facial 
disfigurements do not fall within the proper domain of the behavioral immune system, people 
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may nonetheless react with stronger behavioral immune responses to benign facial 
disfigurements than to obesity. I test this hypothesis in four studies. 
Study 1 
My goal for Study 1 was to test whether people more strongly associate infectious 
concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity. To measure associations, participants 
completed one of two versions of a custom Implicit Association Test—I call it an Anomaly-
Infection IAT—where they categorized infectious concepts (e.g., epidemic) or harmless concepts 
(e.g., typewriter) in combination with faces bearing or not bearing one of two anomalous facial 
features: disfigurement or obesity. This implicit approach mimics that used in prior behavioral 
immune literature (e.g., Park et al., 2007) and allows us to estimate the strength of various 
associations while minimizing participant response biases. 
Method 
Participants. Between September 27 and November 22, 2017, 283 undergraduate 
students from the University of Michigan psychology subject pool participated in my study. I 
report pertinent sample information for Study 1 and all other studies in Table 1. I excluded 
participants from my final sample if they did not complete the full set of measures, made errors 
on more than 50% of IAT trials, or completed more than 10% of IAT trials in less than 300 
milliseconds (Greenwald et al., 2003; Wolsiefer et al., 2017).
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Table 1. Participant and stimulus characteristics for Studies 1-4. 
Study Participants Age Women White 
1  283  18.90 (2.16)  167 (59%)  171 (60%) 
2 256 18.90 (1.11) 152 (59%) 165 (65%) 
3 & 4 134 18.84 (0.90) 87 (65%) 99 (74%) 
Note. The table displays study number, total number of participants, mean age (standard 
deviation in parentheses), number of (percentage) excluded participants, number of 
(percentage) women, number of (percentage) white participants, and total number of stimuli. 
 
 
Procedure. Following consent, participants were randomly assigned to read instructions 
for one of two versions of the Anomaly-Infection IAT: an Obesity-Infection IAT or a 
Disfigurement-Infection IAT. As with a standard Implicit Associations Test, participants 
categorized words and images according to pairs of category labels as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Specifically, participants pressed one of two computer keys to classify words as either 
Harmless or Infectious, and, depending on their version of the IAT, to classify faces as (1) 
Average or Obese or as (2) Average or Disfigured. Depending on the type of trial, the keys to 
categorize faces shared the keys to categorize words. For example, on some trials, participants 
used the same key to categorize Harmless words and Disfigured faces. To ensure understanding, 
participants read definitions of Harmless and Infectious word categories prior to beginning the 
test. 
Harmless Definition: Not harmful or injurious; not likely to irritate or offend; benign or 
innocuous. 
Infectious Definition: Causing or communicating infection; tending to spread (disease) 
from one to another; contagious. 
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The Anomaly-Infection IAT featured blocks of 28 single-category learning trials, 28 
paired-category practice trials, and 56 test trials; otherwise, my IAT procedure followed the 
standard design found in Greenwald et al. (2003) (see Table 2). For each participant, practice and 
test trials began with the category pairs of Harmless- Anomaly vs. Infectious- Average or pairs 
of Infectious-Anomaly vs. Harmless-Average. Following this, category pairs were swapped and 
participants completed additional blocks of practice and test trials. Because the standard IAT 
effect depends on the order in which category pairs are seen, this order was randomized between 
participants. Finally, participants completed measures of individual differences (see below), 
demographic questions, and open-ended questions about their experience in the study. 
Table 2. Sequence of Trial Blocks in our Anomaly-Infection IAT (Study 1). 
Block Trials Function Left Key Right Key 
1 28 Learning Harmless Words Infectious Words 
2 28 Learning Anomalous Faces Average Faces 
3 28 Practice 
Harmless Words + Anomalous 
Faces 
Infectious Words + Average 
Faces 
4 56 Test 
Harmless Words + Anomalous 
Faces 
Infectious Words + Average 
Faces 
5 28 Learning Average Faces Anomalous Faces 
6 28 Practice 
Harmless Words + Average 
Faces 
Infectious Words + Anomalous 
Faces 
7 56 Test 
Harmless Words + Average 
Faces 
Infectious Words + Anomalous 
Faces 
Notes. Function indicates the purpose of the trials in a given block. Left and Right Key 
columns indicate which response was paired with the left or right keyboard button. Anomalous 
faces were either Obese faces or Disfigured faces, depending on condition.  
 
Face Stimuli. I selected 8 white men’s faces from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 
2015). I used men’s faces in order to reduce the number of factors in my analyses and thereby 
increase power to detect an effect. I recruited an artist from www.fiverr.com to digitally 
manipulate each face twice to appear obese or to possess a port-wine stain birthmark (16 total 
images). I refer to these facial cues as Anomalous cues. I recruited 200 participants from 
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Amazon Mechanical Turk to rate all 9 faces under all face-type conditions (Disfigured, Obese, 
and No Manipulation) on a list of subjective features: Disfigured, Germy, Fat, Heavy, 
Unpleasant, Upset, Happy, Clear, Realistic, and Photoshopped. As expected, the participants 
rated the Obese faces as significantly fatter and heavier (on average) than the Disfigured and 
Non-Manipulated faces, and they rated the Disfigured faces as significantly more disfigured (on 
average) than the Obese and Non-Manipulated faces (see Figure 1). Unexpectedly, participants 
rated the Obese faces as significantly happier, more unpleasant, and more photoshopped than the 
Disfigured faces. Throughout my paper, I report analyses that do not control for these potential 
confounding variables, and I note whether conclusions change when I do control. 
 
 
Figure 1. Pretest ratings by face type and rating variable. Bars represent average rating, collapsing over stimulus, and error 
bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (1,000 resamples). 
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Word Stimuli. I used a variety of dictionaries and my own judgment to select 8 words 
that refer to Harmless objects or concepts and 8 words that refer to Infectious objects or 
concepts. The set of Harmless words served as a non-threatening comparison set. I conducted a 
post-hoc survey asking undergraduate participants to report whether they associate these words 
with the categories I assigned them to. Participants explicitly associated harmless words less with 
infection than with infection words. These words were used as stimuli in Studies 1-3. 
Harmless Words: Tape, Cardboard, Typewriter, Dryer, Bran, Teaspoon, Sod, and 
Ground 
Infectious Words: Epidemic, Germs, Plague, Contagion, Flu, Virus, Parasite, and 
Bacteria 
Individual Differences Measures. I had participants complete individual differences 
scales that I could use to evaluate exploratory moderation hypotheses (e.g., automatic 
associations depend on trait infection concern). To assess individual differences in trait infection 
concern, I had participants complete the Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Questionnaire 
(Duncan et al., 2009) and the Three Domains of Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009). To assess 
individual differences in attitudes about obese people, I had participants complete the Anti-Fat 
Attitudes Questionnaire (Crandall, 1994) as well as Height and Weight (which I used to calculate 
the Body Mass Index). Finally, I also assessed Negative Emotionality from the Big Five 
Inventory-2 (Soto & John, 2017). 
Removed Trials. I removed 1280/46536 target trials (3%) (i.e., trials from Blocks 3, 4, 6, 
and 7) responded to in less than 400 milliseconds or responded to after 10,000 milliseconds 
(Greenwald et al., 2003; Martin, 2016). 
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Statistical Power. To compute statistical power, I used Power ANalysis for GEneral 
Anova (PANGEA) version 0.02 (Westfall, 2016), which provides analytical solutions (i.e., 
solved via equations rather than simulation) for user-specified contrasts. I specified a fixed factor 
for Condition (2 Levels: Obese or Disfigured), Congruent Category (2 Levels: Incongruent or 
Congruent), a fixed factor for Stimulus Category (4 Levels: Infectious Word (n = 8), Harmless 
Word (n = 8), Average Face (n = 8), Anomalous Face (n = 8), a random factor for Participant (n 
= 256), and a random factor for Stimulus (n = 8 per Stimulus Category). I further specified 
Stimulus as nested within Stimulus Category and Participant nested within Condition (Word or 
Face). I used the default values for variance estimates: var(error) + var(Participant * Stimulus * 
Condition) = 0.217, var(Stimulus * Congruent Category * Condition) = 0.043, and 
var(Participant * Congruent Category) = 0.087. Given my specifications, I had 80% power to 
detect Cohen’s d = 0.24. 
Analysis Plan. Implicit Association Tests assess differences in reaction times to classify 
stimuli during incongruent trials (here, the Anomaly category paired with the Harmless category) 
compared to congruent trials (the Anomaly category paired with the Infectious category). In 
order to account for variability in reaction time associated with participant, stimulus, and other 
IAT-specific factors, I fit linear mixed effects models that resemble those described by Wolsiefer 
et al. (2017), who extended the conventional scoring algorithm developed by Greenwald et al., 
2003 to a mixed models framework. Specifically, in all analyses, I used a model that included 
fixed effects terms for between-subjects experimental condition (Obese = -0.5, Disfigured = 0.5), 
whether the trial was congruent (Congruent = -0.5, Incongruent = 0.5), trial order (Incongruent 
Trials First = -0.5, Congruent Trials First = 0.50), stimulus type (Word = -0.5, Face = 0.5), word 
category (Harmless = -0.5, Infectious = 0.5, Face = 0), and face category (Average = -0.5, Obese 
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= 0.5, Disfigured = 0.5, Word = 0). In addition, to adjust for general processing speed, a potential 
confound, I averaged each participant’s reaction times across their learning trials (i.e., classifying 
only words or only faces) and included this participant-level average as a covariate. Unlike the 
D-score typically calculated for IATs, this approach adjusts the effect of interest without giving 
more weight to participants with less variable reaction times and without sacrificing the 
interpretation that longer average reaction times during incongruent vs. congruent trials reflect 
stronger automatic associations between infectious concepts and anomalous cues resembling 
historical infection indicators. 
My initial models also included random terms for participant and stimuli intercepts as 
well as for participant and stimuli congruent effect slopes. When models failed to converge or 
produced singular fits, I removed random terms following recommendations from Bates et al. 
(2015) (also see Barr et al., 2013). Ultimately, I built these models to estimate the congruency 
effect.  
Results 
I first tested associations between anomalous cues and infection concepts as a replication 
of prior research and then examined differences in association strength depending on the type of 
anomalous cue. 
Do people automatically associate anomalous cues with infectious concepts? On 
average, participants took 314 milliseconds longer, 95% CI [287, 343], Cohen’s d = 0.47 (for d 
computation, see Judd et al., 2017), to classify words and faces when the anomalous category—
either Obese or Disfigured—shared a response key with the Harmless category compared to the 
Infectious category (see Figure 2). This suggests that participants more strongly associated 
anomalous faces with the Infectious category than with Harmless category, and they more 
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strongly associated Infectious words with the anomalous category than with the Average 
category. 
 
Figure 2. The bars in Panel A represent estimated reaction time means for incongruent (blue bars) and congruent trials (red 
bars) that have been adjusted for general processing speed, among other design factors. Bigger differences between bars (blue 
minus red) indicate stronger automatic associations for anomalous cues and infectious concepts. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals based on the standard error of the Congruent x Anomalous Cue interaction (fit using the effects R package; 
(Fox & Hong, 2009; Fox & Weisberg, 2018). The mixture of violin and boxplots in Panel B represent the full range of raw 
reaction time within the different types of trials. The violin regions index the probability of observing reaction times in that 
region (i.e., wider regions mean scores are more probable there). Boxplots depict the median line, the interquartile range, and 
“whiskers” extending at most 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the 25th and 75th percentiles (reaction times beyond that 
are considered extreme). 
 
Does the automatic association between anomalous cues and infectious concepts 
depend on the type of anomalous cue? The congruency effect size depended on the type of 
anomalous cue, MDifference = 262 milliseconds, 95% CI [205, 321]1, Cohen’s d = 0.39. On 
 
1 For main effects and interactions from the model, I report parametric bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals (1000 resamples; see confint.merMod from the lme4 R package (Bates et 
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average, participants took 445 milliseconds longer, 95% CI [405, 485], to classify words and 
faces when the Disfigured category shared a response key with the Harmless category compared 
to the Infectious category, whereas the corresponding difference in reaction time was 183 
milliseconds, 95% CI [144, 223], when the anomalous category was Obese (see Figure 2). Thus, 
though participants automatically associated both Obese and Disfigured categories with 
Infectious concepts (and Average categories with Harmless concepts), this association was 
stronger between Disfigured categories and Infectious concepts. 
Discussion 
 In Study 1, participants completed an Implicit Association Test in which they categorized 
Harmless and Infectious words and faces as either (1) Average or Obese or (2) Average or 
Disfigured. Obesity and Disfigurement served as anomalous cues that previous research suggests 
are associated with infection because these facial features deviate from human-typical 
morphology. Participants more strongly associated both types of anomalous cues with Infectious 
concepts than with Harmless concepts. But this difference in association strength also depended 
on the type of anomalous cue. This difference was larger for Disfigurement cues than for Obesity 
cues, supporting the hypothesis that people perceive facial disfigurement as a more diagnostic 
infection cue than obesity. However, Study 1 is limited because its design does not allow for an 
“uncontaminated” comparison between facial disfigurement to obesity. That is, due to the 
standard IAT design, the current findings could reflect stronger associations made between 
average faces and harmless concepts in the context of disfigured faces as compared to obese 
 
al., 2014) but for conditional main effects (i.e., simple slopes), I report simultaneous confidence 
intervals based on the normal approximation. 
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faces. To disentangle this possibility, Study 2 used a modified IAT design in which participants 
could classify obesity and facial disfigurement cues within the same Implicit Association Test. 
Study 2 
 My goal for Study 2 was, like Study 1, to test whether people more strongly associate 
infectious concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity. But I designed my Study 2 
Anomaly-Infection IAT to assess the association strength between both disfigurement and 
infection and obesity and infection in the same task. This allowed us to test my hypothesis 
within-subjects.  
Method 
Participants. Between February 2nd and March 29th, 2017, 256 undergraduate students 
from the University of Michigan psychology subject pool participated in my study. I report 
pertinent sample information for Study 2 and all other studies in Table 1. I used the same 
exclusions criteria from Study 1. 
Procedure. The procedure for Study 2 resembled the procedure for Study 1 except I did 
not randomly assign participants to an Anomalous Cue condition. Instead, participants 
categorized faces as either Obese or Disfigured in the same Implicit Association Test. Thus, no 
Average category was used here. 
Removed Trials. I removed 759/4308 target trials (18%) (i.e., trials from Blocks 3, 4, 6, 
and 7) responded to in less than 400 milliseconds or responded to after 10,000 milliseconds 
(Greenwald et al., 2003; Martin, 2016). 
Statistical Power. Using PANGEA version 0.02 (Westfall, 2016), I specified a fixed 
factor for Condition (2 Levels: Incongruent or Congruent), a fixed factor for Stimulus Category 
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(4 Levels: Infectious Word (n = 8), Harmless Word (n = 8), Obese Face (n = 8), Disfigured Face 
(n = 8), a random factor for Participant (n = 256), and a random factor for Stimulus (n = 8 per 
Stimulus Category). I further specified Stimulus as nested within Stimulus Category (Word or 
Face). I used the default values for variance estimates: var(Error) = 0.20, var(Participant * 
Stimulus * Condition) = 0.05, var(Stimulus * Condition) = 0.10, and var(Participant * Condition) 
= 0.10. Given my specifications, I had 80% power to detect Cohen’s d = 0.35. 
Analysis Plan. Out analysis plan was similar to Study 1, except the anomalous cue 
contrast (Disfigured vs. Obese) was embedded in the congruency effect (Incongruent vs. 
Congruent): In half the trials, the Obese category shared a response key with the Infectious 
category (so the Disfigured category shared a response key with the Harmless category), and in 
the other half of the trials, the Disfigured category shared a response key with the Infectious 
category (so the Obese category shared a response key with the Harmless category). I coded the 
congruency contrast so that larger, more positive values mean that participants took longer when 
the Disfigured category shared a response key with the Harmless category than with the 
Infectious Category (Obese/Congruent = -0.5, Disfigured/Incongruent = 0.5). 
Results 
Do people more strongly associate infectious concepts with disfigurement or 
obesity? On average, participants took 141 milliseconds longer, 95% CI [119, 163], d = 0.25, to 
classify words and faces when the Disfigured category shared a response key with the Harmless 
category compared to the Infectious category (and when the Obese Category shared a response 
key with the Infectious category compared to the Harmless category) (see Figure 3). Thus, 
participants associated Infectious concepts more strongly with Disfigured faces than with Obese 
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Figure 3. The bars in Panel A represent estimated reaction time means for incongruent (blue bars) and congruent trials (red 
bars) that have been adjusted for general processing speed, among other design factors. The difference in the height of the bars 
(blue minus red) indexes the automatic association between an anomalous cue and infectious concepts. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals based on the standard error of the Congruent x Anomalous Cue interaction (fit using the effects R package; 
Fox & Hong, 2009; Fox & Weisberg, 2018). The mixture of violin and boxplots in Panel B represent the full range of raw 
reaction time within the different types of trials. The violin regions index the probability of observing reaction times in that 
region (i.e., wider regions mean scores are more probable there). Boxplots depict the median line, the interquartile range, and 
“whiskers” extending at most 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the 25th and 75th percentiles (reaction times beyond that 
are considered extreme). 
Discussion 
 As in Study 1, participants more strongly associated facial disfigurement with infectious 
concepts than they associated obesity with infectious concepts. Extending findings from Study 1, 
Study 2 showed this pattern when anomalous cue categories were directly compared. .  
Two limitations are present in Studies 1 and 2, however. People may more strongly associate 
negative concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity, regardless of whether those 
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negative concepts are infection-related or not. Moreover, I assumed that participants in the 
previous studies were aware that facial disfigurement is not infectious. It is possible that 
participants instead viewed the disfigurement cues as representing truly infectious hazards. To 
address these issues, in Studies 3A and 3B, I (1) made clear to participants that the facial 
disfigurement cues were benign and (2) tested whether another negative concept—laziness—is 
more strongly associated with disfigurement than obesity. 
Studies 3A and 3B 
Both Studies 3A and 3B were designed to address potential alternative interpretations for 
the findings in Studies 1 and 2. Participants in Study 3 were told the facial disfigurement cues 
they were tasked with classifying were benign burn scars, thereby making it clear that no 
anomalous cues were actually infectious. Study 3B replaced the Infectious category with a Lazy 
category, thereby providing a test of whether people more strongly associate any negative 
concept with disfigured faces compared to obese faces. 
Method 
Participants. Between March 12th and April 4th, 2018, 134 undergraduate students from 
the University of Michigan psychology subject pool participated in my study. I report pertinent 
sample information for Study 3 and all other studies in Table 1. I used the same exclusions 
criteria from Studies 1 and 2. 
Procedure. Study procedures resembled the procedure in Study 2, except I randomly 
assigned participants to either categorize words as Harmless or Infectious and faces as Obese or 
Burn Scar (Study 3A), or categorize words as Harmless or Lazy and faces as Obese or 
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Disfigured (Study 3B). To assist categorizations in Study 3A, I defined Obese and Burn Scar for 
participants. 
Obesity Definition: Obesity means having too much or excessive body fat, more than 
what's considered healthy for one's height. Obesity happens over time when one eats more 
calories than one uses. 
Burn Scar Definition: Burns cause skin cells to die. Damaged skin produces a protein 
called collagen to repair itself. As the skin heals, thickened, discolored areas called scars form. 
Some scars are temporary and fade over time. Others are permanent. 
Word Stimuli. For Study 3B, I used a variety of dictionaries and my own judgment to 
select 8 words that refer to Lazy objects. I also defined this term for participants. 
Lazy Words: Procrastinating, Careless, Indifferent, Inactive, Sluggish, Neglectful, 
Passive, and Slacker 
Lazy Definition: Unwilling to work or use energy; averse or disinclined to work, 
activity, or exertion; indolent. 
Removed Trials. For Study 1A (Burn Scar vs. Obese), I removed 337/10416 target trials 
(3%) (i.e., trials from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7) responded to in less than 400 milliseconds or 
responded to after 10,000 milliseconds (Greenwald et al., 2003; Martin, 2016). For Study 1A 
(Lazy vs. Harmless), I removed 90/11760 target trials (1%) (i.e., trials from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 
7) responded to in less than 400 milliseconds or responded to after 10,000 milliseconds 
Statistical power and analysis plan. I computed power and conducted analyses in Study 
3 the same way as I did in Study 2. Given approximately 67 participants per condition and my 
other specifications, I had 80% power to detect Cohen’s d = 39. 
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Results 
Study 3A. Do people more strongly associate infectious concepts with benign burn 
scars or obesity? On average, participants in Study 3A took 173 milliseconds longer, 95% CI 
[137, 213], d = 0.30, to classify words and faces when the Burn Scar category shared a response 
key with the Harmless category compared to the Infectious category (and when the Obese 
Category shared a response key with the Infectious category compared to the Harmless category) 
(see Figure 4). Thus, participants associated Infectious concepts more strongly with benign Burn 
Scar faces than with Obese faces (or participants associated Harmless concepts more strongly 
with Obese faces than with benign Burn Scar faces). 
 
Figure 4. The bars in Panel A represent estimated reaction time means for incongruent (blue bars) and congruent trials (red 
bars) that have been adjusted for general processing speed, among other design factors (Study 3A). The difference in the height 
of the bars (blue minus red) indexes the automatic association between an anomalous cue and infectious concepts. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals based on the standard error of the Congruent main effect (fit using the effects R package; 
Fox & Hong, 2009; Fox & Weisberg, 2018). The mixture of violin and boxplots in Panel B represent the full range of raw 
reaction time within the different types of trials. The violin regions index the probability of observing reaction times in that 
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region (i.e., wider regions mean scores are more probable there). Boxplots depict the median line, the interquartile range, and 
“whiskers” extending at most 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the 25th and 75th percentiles (reaction times beyond that 
are considered extreme). 
 
Study 3B. Do people more strongly associate lazy concepts with disfigured faces or 
obesity? On average, participants in Study 3B took 120 milliseconds longer, 95% CI [77, 163], d 
= 0.21, to classify words and faces when the Obese category shared a response key with the Lazy 
category compared to the Harmless category (and when the Disfigured Category shared a 
response key with the Harmless category compared to the Lazy category) (see Figure 5). Thus, 
participants associated Infectious concepts more strongly with benign Burn Scar faces than with 
Obese faces (or participants associated Harmless concepts more strongly with Obese faces than 
with benign Burn Scar faces). 
 
Figure 5. The bars in Panel A represent estimated reaction times means for incongruent (blue bars) and congruent trials (red 
bars) that have been adjusted for general processing speed, among other design factors (Study 3B). The difference in the height 
of the bars (blue minus red) indexes the automatic association between an anomalous cue and infectious concepts. Error bars 
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represent 95% confidence intervals based on the standard error of the Congruent main effect (fit using the effects R package; 
Fox & Hong, 2009; Fox & Weisberg, 2018). The mixture of violin and boxplots in Panel B represent the full range of raw 
reaction time within the different types of trials. The violin regions index the probability of observing reaction times in that 
region (i.e., wider regions mean scores are more probable there). Boxplots depict the median line, the interquartile range, and 
“whiskers” extending at most 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the 25th and 75th percentiles (reaction times beyond that 
are considered extreme). 
Discussion 
Studies 3A and 3B helped to address alternative interpretations of my earlier findings. As 
in Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3A, participants more strongly associated infectious concepts with 
facial disfigurement than with obesity, even though participants were made aware that the facial 
disfigurements were caused by non-infectious burns. This result is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that participants associate facial disfigurement with infectious concepts simply 
because they believe that the disfigurements were truly caused by infections. In addition, in 
Study 3B, participants more strongly associated lazy concepts with obesity than facial 
disfigurement. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that people more strongly associate 
any negative concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity. 
General Discussion 
Across four studies, I investigated whether people more strongly associate infectious 
concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity. Consistent with previous findings, I found 
that people associate infectious concepts with both facial disfigurement and obesity (Study 1). 
However, I found that this association is stronger for facial disfigurement compared to obesity 
(Studies 1-3). I found that the infection-disfigurement association was stronger than the 
infection-obesity association in a between-subjects experimental design (Study 1) as well as in a 
within-subjects design (Studies 2 and 3). In addition, I found the infection-disfigurement was 
stronger even when I told the participants the facial disfigurements represented benign (non-
infectious) burn scars (Study 3A). Last, when I tested whether people simply more strongly 
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associate negative concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity, I found that people more 
strongly associated lazy concepts with obesity than with facial disfigurement (Study 3B). 
Together, these findings provide preliminary evidence that people perceive some benign 
anomalous facial features as more diagnostic of infection than others. 
Implications 
These findings lend additional support to the pathogen detection error management 
hypothesis that people over-perceive infectious disease in anomalous cues (i.e., false positive 
errors) when infection indicators are noisy and false negative errors (i.e., deadly infections) are 
more fitness costly than false positives (e.g., missed social opportunities) (Haselton & Nettle, 
2006; Nesse, 2005; Schaller, 2016). That is, the automatic associations I observed between 
infectious concepts and anomalous cues suggest my participants over-perceived infection in both 
obesity and facial disfigurement because infection is costly and at some level participants were 
uncertain whether these cues indicated the people presenting with them were infected. In 
addition, my finding that participants more strongly associated infection with disfigurement than 
with obesity is consistent with the uncertainty condition of the error management hypothesis. If 
participants were equally unsure whether disfigurement or obesity indicated infection, then I 
would predict equal behavioral immune system responses to these cues based on the error 
management hypothesis. But if one anomalous cue better diagnoses infection—or at least 
perceivers think it does—then I would predict that cue to elicit a stronger behavioral immune 
response because uncertainty has been reduced. So, my participants probably associated 
infection more strongly with facial disfigurement than with obesity because they were more 
certain facial disfigurement indicates infection (or that obesity does not indicate infection). 
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 My findings also speak to which cues might make up the “proper” domain of the 
behavioral immune system (Schaller, 2016; Sperber, 1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 
2004)(Schaller, 2016; Sperber, 1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). If the behavioral immune 
system was designed to process cues truly indicative of infection (the proper domain of the 
functional module), then cues that more closely resemble those cues should be easier to process 
and thus should elicit a strong behavioral immune system response (e.g., staring, disgust, 
avoidance). Correspondingly, cues that share perceptual properties of proper domain cues but 
that nonetheless meaningfully deviate in appearance from truly diagnostic infection cues (the 
“actual” domain) should be harder to process and thus should elicit a weak behavioral immune 
response. This implies that a benign facial rash should elicit a practically identical behavioral 
immune response to a truly infectious facial rash if both rashes look the same. In contrast, if 
obesity only minimally resembles swelling caused by an infection or if obesity is not (and has 
not) strongly correlated with infection, then obesity might elicit a weaker behavioral immune 
response compared to more diagnostic cues. My finding that participants more strongly 
associated infection with facial disfigurement than with obesity is consistent with the hypothesis 
that facial disfigurement more closely resembles the behavioral immune system’s proper domain 
inputs than obesity. 
 The possibility that the behavioral immune system responds more strongly to proper 
domain cues has practical implications. When researchers select infection cue stimuli for their 
studies, they might consider how closely their stimuli hew to theoretically proper domain inputs. 
Stimuli that more closely resemble proper domain inputs could elicit stronger behavioral immune 
effects and thus require fewer participants to detect statistically with desired power. Relatedly, if 
researchers are interested in more generalizable effects of the behavioral immune system, they 
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might include stimuli that vary how closely the resemble theoretically proper domain cues 
(Michalak & Ackerman, 2020). Importantly, cues that less closely resemble proper domain cues 
might elicit stronger effects for people higher in trait-level pathogen threat concern (i.e., 
interaction effects), and cues that more strongly resemble proper domain cues may elicit less 
variable effects across levels of trait threat concern (i.e., main effects) (Ackerman et al., 2018; 
Tybur et al., 2014). Last (and more speculatively), researchers interested in applying behavioral 
immune system hypotheses to stigma intervention research might consider the extent to which 
pathogen concerns explain variability in stigma directed toward people who present with 
anomalous facial features. Recall from my findings that people associated infectious concepts 
with obesity, but they more strongly associated obesity with lazy concepts. If a stigmatized facial 
feature does not closely resemble an infection cue, then pathogen avoidance psychology may 
play a smaller role in the stigma and might only weakly inform an intervention study design. 
Limitations 
 My findings were limited in at least two important ways. First, my participant samples 
comprised only Michigan undergraduates (see Table 1), even my relatively large face stimuli 
sample comprised only young, white men, and I only investigated two anomalous facial features: 
obesity and disfigurement. Harmful pathogens and their symptoms present in the face are 
numerous and highly variable, and many benign features resemble these infection symptoms to 
variable degrees. Importantly, these facial features and how people perceive them vary across the 
world. My participant and stimuli samples by no means represent this rich global variation. 
Second, my dependent measures are limited to automatic associations between infectious 
concepts and anomalous facial features. Future research might investigate whether a variety of 
anomalous facial cues elicit similar patterns in other behavioral immune responses like attention, 
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disgust, and avoidance (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2009; Lieberman et al., 2012; Miller & Maner, 
2012; Ryan et al., 2012). That said, my findings are relatively strong (i.e., four studies with large 
test statistics, small p-values) and thus lend preliminary support to the error management 
hypotheses I described. 
Conclusion 
 Across four studies, I found evidence that people automatically associate infectious 
concepts with two anomalous facial features: facial disfigurement and obesity. However, people 
more strongly associated infectious concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity. These 
findings lend initial support to the hypothesis that cues that more strongly resemble proper 
domain input to the behavioral immune system (i.e., highly diagnostic infection cues) elicit 
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Chapter III. Mental Representations of Infected Others 
What does an infected person look like? In your mind, you might picture someone pale 
and weak, someone with a runny nose and watery eyes, or someone with facial rashes and sores. 
Whichever features appeared in your mind’s eye, where did they come from? If you are a health 
professional or researcher, you probably chose features that align with specific theories and 
hypotheses in your field. In contrast, if you are a layperson, you probably chose features based 
on intuition, experience, and stereotypes. Put differently, mental representations depend on 
expectations. These expectations constrain the breadth of the features we imagine, and, 
consequently, the features we study, as well as the methods and measurement tools we use to 
study them.  
 I propose that the choices researchers make based on their expectations, even when 
emerging from theory, can limit the ability of studies to wholly capture how people mentally 
represent aspects of others, such as threats. Moreover, even methods that enable participants to 
report how they mentally represent social categories (thereby minimizing the influence of 
researcher expectations) still reflect participant expectations. Thus, such methods may not match 
what those individuals spontaneously represent in their mind’s eye. Do methods that allow for 
strong influences from expectations produce similar or different representations than methods 
that restrict the influence of expectations? I examine this question in the domain of pathogen 
threat psychology, where perceivers represent the faces of infected others.  
I begin by reviewing how a functional perspective on threat management explains why 
perceivers orient to particular cues of threat (i.e., threat-specificity), and then I detail the 
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strengths and limitations of expectation-driven versus data-driven methods of threat assessment. 
To preview my empirical findings, when participants could easily apply stereotypic beliefs, their 
representations showed more threat-specificity than when such expectations were constrained by 
a data-driven reverse correlation task. These results suggest that our current understanding of 
threat management psychology may be limited by approaches that privilege expectations—of 
laypeople or of researchers—for choosing experimental stimuli and testing aspects of threat 
processing.  
Functional Threat Management 
People process and react to sick individuals differently than they do violent individuals. 
This is, in part, because effectively avoiding infection requires different behaviors than avoiding 
violence. For example, one washes their hands to avoid getting sick when interacting with 
someone who coughs and sneezes, whereas one raises their hands to avoid injury when 
interacting with someone who brandishes a weapon. Distinct threats entail distinct psychological 
and behavioral solutions. From what I refer to as the functional threat management perspective, 
natural selection has favored mental systems that enable people to perceive, feel, think, and 
behave in ways to reduce threats in particular rather than threats in general (Barrett, 2012; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Holbrook & Fessler, 2015; Neuberg et al., 2011; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). This perspective does not imply that specific threats always elicit specific responses (e.g., 
most threats elicit anxiety due to shared processing mechanisms), but a fully general response to 
all threats would be less efficient than responses targeting the unique affordances of each threat.  
Consistent with this perspective, a growing body of evidence suggests people exhibit 
functional responses to specific threat cues. For example, people expressed more disgust in 
response to, and were less willing to touch, objects that had been touched by people with visible 
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cues of influenza compared to the same objects that had been touched by visibly healthy targets 
(Ryan et al., 2012). People also expressed more disgust by and less willingness to touch those 
objects when the target people bore non-infectious facial blotches, suggesting participants 
perceived features that merely resembled infection cues as if they were true indicators; that 
perception made them avoid touching objects that had been “contaminated” through physical 
contact. Sensitivity to many such facial features, including disfigurement, discoloration, 
swelling, and wrinkles, has been connected to the experience of pathogen threat (Ackerman et 
al., 2018; Ryan et al., 2012). In studies examining threat from aggression, responses differ. For 
example, people estimated greater state and trait anger in men holding household items that 
could be used as weapons (e.g., garden sheers) compared with men holding objects that are less 
plausible as weapons (e.g., a watering can) (Holbrook et al., 2014). Thus, a threat-specific cue 
elicited a functional response: People perceived men holding plausible weapons as more prone to 
anger. Other research has linked aggression threat to formidable physical features such as size 
and weight (Fessler et al., 2012). Based on both theory and findings such as these, researchers 
have made the case that mental systems connected to disease avoidance and violence avoidance 
involve distinct emotional responses, cognitive associations, and neurobiology (Neuberg et al., 
2011; Oaten et al., 2009; Schaller et al., 2003).  
Limitations of Common Threat Management Methods 
Although perspectives on threat management such as the functional perspective have 
generated rich and productive literatures, they have also motivated the use of research designs 
that face two inferential challenges for answering how people mentally represent threats. The 
first challenge emerges from factors researchers omit from their study designs. Creating study 
methods, measures, and stimuli based on researcher-expectations may obscure evidence for 
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effects and processes not associated with those expectations. For instance, pathogen threat 
researchers have used some combination of theory and intuition to select cues to investigate, 
including rashes, swelling, and lesions as well as physical anomalies that resemble such cues, 
like port-wine stain birthmarks, crossed-eyes, obesity, and wrinkled skin (Ackerman et al., 2009; 
Duncan et al., 2009; Park et al., 2007; Ryan et al., 2012). In a typical study, researchers examine 
a threat-specific cue by manipulating its presence, manipulating the motivational state of the 
perceiver, or by measuring evaluations of the cue and the perceiver. Researchers then assess 
attention, explicit and implicit attitudes, emotional responses, or other types of reactions. Results 
of such studies inform whether people react to the chosen cues or manipulations, but those 
results may not generalize to other cues and manipulations. This may not seem like much of a 
problem—research has to start somewhere. But if such results do not generalize to unmeasured 
yet threat-relevant cues, then claims about threat-specificity—a key inference made from the 
functional perspective—would be unknowingly limited to the findings of reported study designs. 
In other words, conclusions would be biased (to a degree) by researcher design choices. 
Consider an example from a different literature. Over a decade of research found support for the 
hypothesis that people use perceptions of warmth and competence to understand social groups 
(Fiske et al., 2002). But this research was limited by the ratings scales (e.g., friendly, smart) and 
social groups (e.g., Blacks, women) researchers used in their studies. When researchers gave 
participants the opportunity to spontaneously generate social groups and evaluate them using 
their own psychological dimensions, they found that participants organized a wide variety of 
social groups using two novel dimensions: low-high socioeconomic status and conservative-
progressive beliefs (Koch et al., 2016). Relying primarily on researcher-driven design choices 
led to mistaken, or at least limited, conclusions. 
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A second inferential challenge emerges when equating perceiver reactions with perceiver 
representations. Perceivers may react to threatening features of stimuli chosen by researchers but 
not spontaneously include those features in their threat representations. For example, if presented 
with photos of faces varying in age, perceivers may rate the younger faces as looking more 
trustworthy (Zebrowitz & Franklin Jr, 2014). However, if asked to list visible features of a 
trustworthy person, perceivers may not spontaneously list youth as a feature of a trustworthy 
appearance. As findings from studies measuring reactions to specific cues chosen by researchers 
accumulate, researchers may begin to treat these cues as though they collectively embody how 
people represent threatening others in their minds. However, this conclusion suffers from the fact 
that people may react to features that are not present in their mental representations, and they 
may mentally represent threats with features that researchers have not examined in reaction-
based studies. To elaborate on the potential problems associated with this issue, I conceptualize 
mental representations next.  
Mental representations of threat 
Mental representations of threatening others characterize the internal prototype of a 
threat—how those threats are construed in the mind—and they include a set of key features. 
First, mental representations combine information across multiple processing levels, from lower-
level perception to conceptual knowledge and higher-level cognitive states (Freeman & Ambady, 
2011). Second, mental representations emerge dynamically in that people continuously construct 
their representations from these multiple information sources. Third, mental representations are 
complex combinations of information that can be “seen” in people’s minds (Farah, 1988; Haxby 
et al., 2000; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Mechelli et al., 2004). For example, visual cues (e.g., white 
skin, frown), information regarding social categories (e.g., adult white male), behaviors (e.g., he 
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coughed), traits (e.g., he is withdrawn), and affective evaluations (e.g., bad, yuck) meld together 
into a sort of “mental mush” (Carlston & Smith, 1996, p. 184) that forms a mental representation 
(Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Sherman, 1996; Wyer, 2007). In sum, mental representations are 
built continuously from multiple sources of information and can be visualized in the mind.  
Mental representations are infrequently studied in the threat literature relative to 
piecemeal processes such as perceiver reactions, evaluations, and associations. Presumably, they 
can be understood from a functional threat management perspective. To the extent that threats 
are processed in a threat-specific manner, representations should contain evidence of threat-
specific features. Operationally, this specificity requires some features to be both associated with 
threat and distinctive of particular threats. Whereas a mental image of an infected person may 
appear sick and blotchy, a mental image of a violent person may appear angry and intimidating. 
To the extent that threats are processed more generally, however, these threat representations 
should share features with each other. A better understanding of these representations would 
provide insight into how threats are processed holistically as compared to studies that target 
reactions to individual cues. Indeed, it may be critical to investigate mental representations in 
order to address important limitations of the threat literature described earlier. 
Current Research 
To address these limitations, I used multiple approaches to estimate mental 
representations of two threat categories: infected persons and violent persons. I evaluate results 
from each approach according to two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis—what I label the threat-
specificity hypothesis—follows from the functional threat management perspective and thus is 
consistent with the expectations of researchers using this perspective. The threat-specificity 
hypothesis predicts that threat representations will primarily include cues specific to and 
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diagnostic of that threat. The second hypothesis—what I label the threat-combination 
hypothesis—is the natural complement to the first. The threat-combination hypothesis predicts 
threat representations will include a combination of threat cues common across multiple types of 
threats. In sum, threat-specificity predicts representations will appear to pose one kind of threat 
(e.g., strong infection-related cues), whereas threat-combination predicts representations will 
appear to pose 2 or more kinds of threat (e.g., equally strong infection- and violence-related 
cues). 
To test these hypotheses, I use two types of empirical approaches. First, in studies 
following an expectation-driven approach, participants listed traits they “saw” when imagining 
what infected and violent persons look like (Study 1) and drew infected and violent persons’ 
faces (Study 2). These are common methods of assessing mental representations (Andersen & 
Klatzky, 1987; Stangor et al., 1992; Stangor & Lange, 1994). Qualitatively, these data gave us 
insight into which features come to mind when participants think of infected others in contrast to 
violent others. Much like researcher expectations can influence estimates of mental 
representations, participant expectations can, too. Participant-generated responses privilege the 
beliefs of perceivers in that perceivers are likely to deliberately edit their responses based on 
their own intuitions or stereotypes about what a given social category entails. To the extent that 
people expect threats to be distinct, substantial threat-specificity should characterize the resulting 
mental representations.  
The second approach attempts to constrain perceiver (and researcher) expectations. For 
multiple reasons (e.g., insufficient access to internal representations), perceivers may report 
content that fits normative expectations but is not representative of how a social category appears 
in their mind’s eye. To address this, I used a data-driven approach by leveraging reverse 
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correlation methods. Reverse correlation methods exploit the relationship between stimulus and 
response. Whereas more typical approaches estimate the correlation between fixed, researcher-
selected stimulus attributes, and participant responses, “reverse” correlation approaches estimate 
the correlation between random stimulus attributes and participant selections (Brinkman et al., 
2017; Dotsch & Todorov, 2012b; Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Todorov et al., 2011). For 
example, in the 2-image forced choice image classification task—a particular reverse correlation 
task—a base face is overlaid with random digital noise masks to represent many versions of that 
face with variable facial attributes. Perceivers choose from pairs of such faces the one that best 
represents the target category (e.g., Infected). Researchers then create a classification image by 
averaging the noise patterns from those perceiver choices and applying that average noise pattern 
to the original base image. This classification image serves as a visual proxy of the social 
category representation. Importantly, these images are participant-selected, visually compelling, 
and emerge from relatively more spontaneous mental processes. Classification images can then 
be rated along any number of dimensions to determine the features they possess. This approach 
has been used to estimate (visual) mental representations many unique categories, including 
racial and minimal out-groups (Dotsch et al., 2008; Ratner et al., 2014), welfare recipients 
(Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017), and atheists (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2018). Unlike more common 
approaches, the reverse correlation method has received comparatively less attention in the threat 
processing literature. I used this method in Studies 3-5 as a comparison to the expectation-driven 
approaches in earlier studies. Each of these studies includes two phases: In Phase 1, participants 
generated proxy mental images via the 2-image forced choice image classification task, and in 
Phase 2, independent participants rated features of those images generated in Phase 1. 
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Overall, I report five studies using a multi-method approach. I have ordered these to 
begin with studies utilizing methods that mimic researcher-driven expectations, where 
participants can freely apply their beliefs about social categories through deliberation, editing, 
extensive use of time, and so on. The second set of studies uses reverse correlation methods to 
constrain (though not entirely eliminate) these factors. For all but Phase 1 in Studies 2 and 3, I 
preregistered research questions, predictions, sampling plans, exclusion criteria, and analyses. I 
also report sensitivity analyses (i.e., compute the detectable effect size at 80% power given 
sample size and 𝛼) and provide empirical benchmarks for detectable effect sizes. For certain 
analyses, I deviated from our preregistered plans to reduce the number of reported tests and to 
synthesize measures in a conceptually meaningful way. In our supplemental repository 
(Michalak & Ackerman, 2017; https://osf.io/84vdp/), I also include a spreadsheet detailing 
original and revised plans (i.e., those reported in this article). I also make available 
preregistrations, materials, and de-identified data for all studies, including data sets not reported 
here. Finally, I include additional analyses in our repository (e.g., individual differences effects 
within each study). 
Study 1 
 Our first goal in Study 1 was to give participants the opportunity to report which visible 
features they see in their mind’s eye when they envision infected and violent others in order to 
test the threat-specific and threat-combination hypotheses. Here, participants simply listed visible 
traits they believed correspond with each of two threat categories. Our second goal was to 
evaluate whether the listed set of features supported the threat-specificity or threat-combination 
hypothesis. The threat-specificity hypothesis predicts participants would list only features 
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specific to and diagnostic of that threat, whereas the threat-combination hypothesis predicts 
participants would list a combination of features common across multiple types of threats.  
Method 
Listing visible traits of Germy and Violent persons 
Participants. I recruited undergraduate psychology student participants between March 
25th, 2019 and September 25th, 2019 (see Table 3 for pertinent sample characteristics). 
 
Table 3. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Characteristics of participant roles in Studies 1-5. 
Study Source Role N Excluded Age Women White 
1 Undergraduate Lister 117 0 (0%) 18.84 (0.81) 49 (42%) 64 (55%) 
2 Undergraduate Artist 147 0 (0%) 19.00 (0.90) 97 (66%) 90 (61%) 
2 MTurk Rater 129 14 (10%) 36.55 (11.74) 76 (59%) 99 (77%) 
3 Undergraduate Chooser 94 2 (2%) 19.13 (1.70) 45 (48%) 72 (77%) 
3 MTurk Rater 272 18 (6%) 35.68 (11.07) 139 (51%) 197 (72%) 
4 Undergraduate Chooser 205 0 (0%) 18.75 (0.92) 153 (75%) 180 (88%) 
4 MTurk Rater 464 50 (10%) 37.97 (12.27) 242 (52%) 301 (65%) 
5 MTurk Chooser 200 44 (18%) 36.94 (11.38) 92 (46%) 149 (75%) 
5 MTurk Rater 505 37 (7%) 35.46 (10.88) 272 (54%) 384 (76%) 
Note. See supplement for additional information. 
 
 
Statistical power. I are interested in whether some words are used more or less 
frequently to describe traits for Infected persons than for Violent persons (i.e., proportion 
differences). Power formulas for the difference between proportions require a non-intuitive 
arcsine transformation to obtain Cohen’s h, which I report and explain next. Participants used a 
total of 3335 trait words. This many words affords 80% power to detect Cohen’s h = 0.07 
(pwr.2p.test function in the pwr package in R; Champely, 2018). Importantly, the size of 
Cohen’s h depends on the difference in proportions and on the size of the proportions compared. 
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For example, a 2% difference from 50% corresponds to a larger Cohen’s h (h = 0.04) than a 2% 
difference from 5% (h = 0.08). 
Procedure. After consenting to participate, participants read: 
 “In this task, we'd like you to imagine two specific kinds of people. Specifically, what do 
these kinds of people look like? When you imagine either of these kinds of people, what 
traits can you see these people having?” 
 Next, participants listed in separate text boxes up to 10 visible traits for an Infected 
person and 10 visible traits for a Violent person, each on a separate page. At the top of each 
page, participants read, “What does an infected [violent] person look like?” above a definition of 
infected [violent]: 
infected: affected or contaminated (a person, organ, wound, etc.) with disease-producing 
germs or pathogens; capable of causing infection in other people 
violent: prone to commit acts of violence; uses physical force intended to hurt, damage, 
or kill someone or something 
Results 
 Analysis Plan. I used the tidytext and wordcloud R packages (Fellows, 2018; Queiroz et 
al., 2019) to extract and count the number of words from participants’ lists of traits (connecting 
i.e. stop words such as “in” and “with” were excluded). Next, research assistants categorized 
synonyms under single, common terms (e.g., angry and anger were both coded as angry). I then 
computed word frequencies by dividing the count of specific words within each threat category 
(e.g., weak, angry) by the count of all words used within that threat category. Finally, I tested 
differences in these proportions between threat categories using Fisher’s Exact Test. 
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 Top traits listed within threat categories. Participants most frequently listed eye, pale, 
tired, weak, sick, red, nose, skin, coughing, and sweaty as visible traits for Infected others (see 
Figure 6). The words eye, red, skin, and nose require context to interpret. Each involved 
qualifiers associated with sickness states. For example, eye included “drowsy eyed” and “heavy 
eyebags,” red included “red cheeks” and “red nose,” skin included “greenish/yellowish tinted 
skin” and “pale grey skin,” and nose included “runny nose” and “blowing nose.” In contrast, 
participants most frequently listed angry, face, eye, looking, strong, aggressive, muscular, dark, 
mean, and big as visible traits for Violent others. The words face, eye, looking, and dark also 
involved relevant qualifiers. For example, face included “angry face” and “scowling face,” eye 
included “scary, dark eyes” and “angry eyebrows,” looking included “angry looking” and 
“mean-looking,” and dark included “dark, scary eyes” or was listed by itself. Note that eye was 
used in both Infected and Violent responses, but for different reasons. 
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Figure 6. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Each panel displays as proportions (x-axis) the top 40 most frequently 
listed visible traits (y-axis) for the Infected target (left panel) or Violent target (right panel). Bar fill indicates whether the word 
was shared (dark grey) or not (white) across threat categories (e.g., the word “eye” is a shared word because it was used to 
describe traits of both threat categories). Error bars represent 95% profile confidence limits. I added a dotted line at 3% for 
reference comparing across panels. 
 
The most frequently used words in Infected trait responses were either not used in the 
Violent trait responses (pale and weak), used significantly less frequently in the Violent 
responses (tired and sick), or were used to describe different impressions than in the Violent 
responses (eye was used to describe “drowsy eyed” for an Infected trait but “scary, dark eyes” 
for a Violent trait) (see Table 4). Similarly, the most frequently used words in the Violent trait 
responses were either not used in the Infected trait responses (aggressive, mean), used 
significantly less frequently in the Infected responses (angry, strong, muscular), or were used to 
describe different impressions than in the Infected responses (face was used to describe 
  45 
“scowling face” for a Violent trait but “pale face” for an Infected trait). Taken together, the trait 
listings suggest that people envision visible traits relatively specific to each threat category. 
Table 4. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Between-threat category comparisons among top 10 most frequently 
used words within each threat category (Study 1). 
Word Infected Violent OR Lower Upper h 
Eye 4.46% 2.60% 1.75 1.18 2.62 0.10 
Pale 4.28% 0.00% ∞ 19.47 ∞ 0.42 
Tired 3.51% 0.06% 60.02 10.34 2384.35 0.33 
Red 2.50% 0.97% 2.62 1.44 5.01 0.12 
Weak 2.50% 0.00% ∞ 10.95 ∞ 0.32 
Sick 2.38% 0.12% 20.10 5.20 171.68 0.24 
Nose 2.14% 0.12% 18.05 4.63 154.80 0.22 
Skin 2.02% 0.18% 11.34 3.56 57.83 0.20 
Coughing 1.78% 0.00% ∞ 7.63 ∞ 0.27 
Sweaty 1.72% 0.42% 4.12 1.76 11.18 0.13 
Angry 0.18% 5.20% 0.03 0.01 0.10 -0.38 
Face 1.37% 2.96% 0.45 0.26 0.76 -0.11 
Looking 1.31% 2.12% 0.61 0.34 1.08 -0.06 
Strong 0.06% 1.81% 0.03 0.00 0.19 -0.22 
Aggressive 0.00% 1.63% ∞ ∞ 0.14 -0.26 
Muscular 0.12% 1.39% 0.08 0.01 0.34 -0.17 
Dark 0.36% 1.33% 0.27 0.09 0.68 -0.11 
Mean 0.00% 1.33% ∞ ∞ 0.18 -0.23 
Big 0.00% 1.27% ∞ ∞ 0.19 -0.23 
Notes. Words are ordered by frequency within each threat category. The word “eye” topped 
both lists, so we table 19 instead of 20 most frequent words. Grey highlights indicate Infected 
person words. OR represents the odds ratio; lower and upper together represent the 95% 
confidence interval limits for the OR; and h represents Cohen’s h (bolded h values are 
significantly different at 𝛼 = .05). Last, ∞ represents infinity or undefined because one of the 
proportions in the odds ratio was exactly 0. 
 
Discussion 
 Participants in Study 1 listed visible traits they expected infected and violent others to 
have. These form an expectation-driven representation of each category. Participants more often 
listed infection-related traits for infected others than for violent others, and they more often listed 
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violence-related traits for violent others than for infected others. Among the top words used to 
describe traits, words used in both threat categories were usually qualified in ways suggesting 
qualitatively different impressions. These results are most consistent with the threat-specificity 
hypothesis. Participants—like functional threat management researchers—expect infected others 
and violent others to possess visible traits that distinguish the kinds of threats those others pose. 
Study 2 
 Study 2 is conceptually similar to Study 1 in that both studies allow participants to 
deliberate on the features to include in their mental representations. However, Study 2 allows 
participants to visually depict such representations. I asked participants to draw Germy (not 
Infected) and Violent persons in Phase 1, and then, in Phase 2, I had independent participants 
rate subjective features present in the drawings. These subjective ratings allowed us to test 
whether participants expect some features to be more strongly associated with infected people’s 
appearance than other features (i.e., within-category comparisons), as well as whether some 
features better distinguish infected people’s appearance from violent people’s appearance (i.e., 
between-category comparisons). Finally, our last goal concerned the function of mental 
representations: I assessed whether people want to avoid the threatening people depicted in these 
mental images. 
Method 
Phase 1: Drawing faces of Germy and Violent persons 
Participants. I recruited undergraduate psychology student participants between March 
29th, 2017 and April 7th, 2017 (see Table 3 for pertinent sample characteristics). 
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Statistical power. I based power calculations in part on correlations between individual 
differences (see supplementary repository) and features to be judged later (in Phase 2). Casting 
these features as dependent measures, 147 artists afforded 80% power to detect Pearson’s r = .23 
(pwr.r.test function in the pwr package in R; Champely, 2018). 
Procedure. I initially recruited participants for a study focusing on separate research 
questions about infectious disease (see the materials supplement in our repository). At the end of 
that study, participants completed the Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Questionnaire (Duncan 
et al., 2009) and saw a short debriefing page. Then I gave participants a pencil and a piece of 
paper with task instructions and a large oval on both sides. The instructions asked people to draw 
either a Germy face or a Violent face (manipulated within-subjects): “What does a germy 
[violent] person look like? 
germy: full of germs; germ infested; appearing either sick or contaminated 
violent: prone to commit acts of violence; uses physical force intended to hurt, damage, 
or kill someone or something 
Please use the outline for a face below to draw a germy [violent] person.” 
 I chose the Germy label after consulting with our undergraduate research assistants who 
believed that “Germy” would be most interpretable to undergraduate participants (in temporal 
order, this study was run prior to Study 1). See Figure 7 for example drawings (I make all our 
participants' drawings available in our online supplement). Among the 147 participants, 139 
(94.56%) drew both a Germy and a Violent face. Our final stimuli sample comprised 139 pairs of 
drawings2. 
 
2 By accident, 11 raters evaluated 1 or more blank drawings. We report results excluding these ratings. Mean 
differences are similar, and statistical significance decisions are the same whether or not we include these ratings 
data. See analysis supplement in our repository. 
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Figure 7. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Images depict examples of a Germy drawing rated extremely Germy 
and a Violent drawing rated extremely violent (Study 2). 
 
Phase 2: Measuring feature dimensions of drawn faces 
Participants. I planned to recruit 138 MTurkers (assuming 10% would fail to meet 
inclusion criteria) using TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017), leaving us with approximately 125 
participants (see preregistration at https://osf.io/utyp6/). I sampled MTurkers until I had recruited 
approximately equal numbers of participants among 56 conditions and N ≥ 125. One hundred 
forty-six participants opened our survey and I paid $0.50 to all 143 (97.95% completion rate) 
participants who submitted their MTurk HIT assignments (see Table 3 for pertinent sample 
characteristics). 
Statistical power. Our final sample (N = 129) afforded us 80% power to detect Cohen’s 
d = 0.35 for the Germy vs. Violent condition effect in the R(NCC) design described in Judd et 
al., 2017: Raters were nested within condition (they only saw Germy or Violent drawings) and 
artists were crossed with drawing category condition (artists drew both Germy and Violent 
faces); these settings combined to make multiple, unique sets of raters and artists. To compute 
this sample size value, I entered into the Shiny Web application (Westfall, 2016, 
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http://jakewestfall.org/two_factor_power/) that accompanies (Judd et al., 2017) the following 
values: total number of participants = 125, Total number of targets = 140, Total number of 
replications = 28, Residual Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) = 0.4, Participant intercept VPC 
= 0.3, Stimulus intercept VPC = 0.2, and Stimulus slope VPC = 0.1. 
Procedure. Research assistants digitally scanned drawings from Phase 1, cropped-out 
instructions, and adjusted image properties to increase visibility when needed. Because our 
stimuli set comprised 280 drawings, I divided this into 28 sets of five Germy drawings and 28 
sets of five Violent drawings (i.e., 56 sets). Raters were randomly assigned to evaluate one of 
these sets (either Germy or Violent); so, raters saw one drawing per artist. Following consent, 
participants used a 9-point scale to rate each drawing on clarity (i.e., “How clear is this image?”), 
from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Extremely). This was meant to familiarize participants with the drawings 
(Dotsch et al., 2008, Study 1). Next, participants completed the subjective feature dimension 
rating portion of the study. Participants read definitions for 12 feature dimensions they would use 
to rate the drawings: germy, disfigured, old, heavy, foreign, fatigued, healthy, violent, angry, 
dominant, muscular, and masculine. Participants were asked to confirm in a textbox at the 
bottom of the survey page that they read and understood the definitions. To reduce the number of 
items per screen, participants rated each drawing by itself on groups of four or five features at a 
time using the same 9-point scale they used for clarity ratings. Participants then used this scale to 
report their intentions to interact with the person represented in each classification image: “If you 
were to meet in real life, how much would you want to avoid physical contact with this person?” 
and “If you were to meet in real life, how willing would you be to stand near this person?” 
Finally, participants answered demographic questions, reported what they thought was the 
purpose of the study, and saw a short debriefing. 
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Results 
Analysis plan. For our key analyses, I followed analyses for the R(NCC) design 
recommended by (Judd et al., 2017). For each rating, I fit a linear mixed effects model using the 
lmer function from the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2014); Satterthwaite degrees of freedom 
and p-values were calculated using the lmerTest package in R (Kuznetsova et al., 2017). 
Specifically, I regressed feature dimension rating (e.g., germy) onto Drawing Type (Violent = -
0.5, Germy = 0.5), and I specified random intercepts for Rater, random intercepts for Artist, and 
random Drawing Type slopes for Artist (i.e., each Artist has their own Drawing Type effect). 
Do Germy persons appear to have stronger infection-related features than less 
infection-related features? Comparing mean feature ratings within the Germy drawings, I 
found that the Germy drawings appeared to have stronger infection-related features than less 
infection-related features (top left plot of Figure 8; see supplement for pairwise tests). In 
particular, the Germy drawings received high average germy, fatigue, and unhealthy ratings (i.e., 
reverse-scored healthy). 
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Figure 8. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Mean feature ratings for the expectation-driven Germy representation 
(Study 2) and data-driven Germy and Infected representations (Studies 3-5). I colored the mean bars to highlight features that 
past research has categorized as cues associated with infection (grey fill) or has not examined in this context (white fill). I also 
reverse-scored trustworthy (untrustworthy) and healthy (unhealthy). The dotted line marks the middle of the response scale. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for individual feature means. 
 
Do people draw Germy and Violent persons differently? Raters judged the Germy 
drawings to be significantly more germy (d = 0.32), less foreign (d = -0.27), less healthy (d = -
0.40), less violent (d =-0.49), less angry (d = -0.64), less dominant (d = -0.62), less masculine (d 
= -0.39), and less muscular (d = -0.26) than the Violent drawings (see Figure 9 for mean 
differences and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals; Bates et al., 2014). Additionally, raters 
judged the Germy drawings to be marginally less old (d = -0.20) but marginally more fatigued (d 
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= 0.18) than the Violent drawings. I found no sufficient evidence that raters judged the Germy 
drawings as more disfigured (d = -0.02) or heavier (d = -0.04) than the Violent drawings. In sum, 
I found evidence that people imagine Germy and Violent persons with many threat-specific 
features: They draw Germy persons with infectious disease cues—poor health and germiness—
and they draw Violent persons with physical harm cues—foreignness, violence, anger, 
masculinity, and dominance. However, other features associated with pathogen avoidance 
responses (e.g., disfigured, heavy), did not significantly differ between the two sets of threat 
representations. 
 
Figure 9. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Mean differences in trait ratings between Germy and Violent drawings 
in Study 2. Dark, vertical lines inside crossbars (shaded boxes) depict fixed effects estimates for trait drawing condition (Germy 
– Violent). The widths of the crossbars represent 95% confidence intervals (bootstrap method, 1,000 resamples). Smaller, faded 
points depict observed difference scores (artist Germy drawing ratings minus their Violent drawing ratings). I also reverse-
scored healthy (unhealthy). 
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Do people want to avoid Germy persons more than Violent persons? I found no sufficient 
evidence that raters wanted to avoid people in the Germy drawings more, MDifference 95% CI [-
0.88, 0.37], than the people in the Violent drawings. However, raters were significantly less 
willing to stand near the people in the Germy drawings (d = -0.23). 
Discussion 
In Study 2, participants drew Germy and Violent people, representing their beliefs about 
what people who pose these threats look like. Examining within-category effects, Germy 
drawings appeared to have some stronger infection-related features (e.g., germy, disfigured, 
fatigued, unhealthy) than infection-unrelated features (e.g., violent, angry, dominant). For 
between-category effects, the Germy drawings in Study 2 were rated more germy, more fatigued, 
and less healthy than the Violent drawings (which were rated more violent, angry, old, and 
dominant than Germy drawings). This was not the case for other infection-related features 
previously examined in the pathogen avoidance literature (e.g., Germy drawings were rated less 
foreign and old than Violent drawings), though work in this literature does not typically compare 
cues between threat categories as I have done. Overall, data in the current study are most 
consistent with the threat-specificity hypothesis. 
Taken together, results from the expectation-driven Studies 1 and 2 suggest participants 
represent Infected people with cues that are specific to and diagnostic of infection threat. In 
Study 1, participants listed visible traits for infected persons that are associated with infection 
and that distinguish an infected person from a violent person. In Study 2, participants drew 
infected persons with features that are associated with infection and that distinguish an infected 
person from a violent person. These findings are consistent with the threat-specificity hypothesis, 
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suggesting that representations derived from expectation-driven methods support hypotheses 
from the functional threat management perspective.  
Study 3 
 To complement the expectation-driven approach in Studies 1 and 2, our first goal for 
Study 3 was to estimate people’s mental images of an infected person while limiting the 
influence of participant (and researcher) expectations. Toward this goal, I recruited participants 
to complete a data-driven, 2-image forced choice reverse correlation task. In this task, 
participants selected hundreds of faces that they thought best represent a Germy person. I then 
averaged their selections to make a proxy Germy mental image. Unlike listing traits or drawing 
representations, the reverse correlation task does not allow participants to edit what their final 
representation looks like in order to bring it in line with their expectations. Thus, the influence of 
expectations is limited (though not entirely eliminated). 
Our next goal was, as in Studies 1 and 2, to assess whether this data-driven representation 
appears primarily with features associated with infection and whether these features distinguish it 
from a non-infected person. Last, I assessed whether people want to avoid the person in the 
Germy mental image. 
Method 
Phase 1: Estimating mental images of a Germy person 
Participants. I recruited undergraduate psychology student participants between 
February 26th, 2016 and March 31st, 2016 (see Table 3 for sample characteristics). I excluded 2 
participants: One of these participants fell asleep during the main task and did not complete the 
task nor any questionnaires, and the other participant was legally blind. 
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Statistical power. Following our analysis rationale from Phase 1 from Study 2, 94 chooser 
participants afforded 80% power to detect Pearson’s r = .28 (pwr.r.test function in the pwr 
package in R; Champely, 2018). 
Procedure. For the 2-image forced choice reverse correlation image classification task, I 
first generated 400 pairs of stimuli using the rcicr package in R (Dotsch, 2016). Using the 
software, I generated each stimulus pair by superimposing a random visual noise mask (on one 
of the pair) and its negative (on the second of the pair) on our base image, a grey scale average of 
all male faces in the Karolinska Face Database (Lundqvist et al., 1998) (see Figure 10). For each 
trial of the task, participants saw in random order a pair of these superimposed images and were 
asked to choose the face that looked more “Germy,” our target label representing an infected 
person. After completing the task, participants answered three questionnaires that assessed trait-
level threat concerns (see supplemental repository). 
 
Figure 10. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). From left to right, the images depict our base face, a random noise 
pattern, an example noise pattern superimposed on the base face, and the inverse of the example noise pattern superimposed on 
the base face (Study 3). 
 
Generating mental images: Classification images. Using rcicr (Dotsch, 2016), I created 
a classification image for this sample’s mental image of a Germy person by first averaging the 
noise patterns of each participant’s chosen faces, then averaging those averages across 
participants, and, finally, by superimposing that average onto our base face (see Figure 10). I did 
the same for the faces not selected—the anti-classification image, which represents this sample’s 
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mental image of a non-Germy person. This distinction mimics comparisons described in 
previous research reports (e.g., welfare vs. non-welfare recipients; Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2018). 
See the non-Germy and Germy classification images in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Images depict non-Germy and Germy classification images (Study 3). 
 
Phase 2: Measuring subjective feature dimensions of Germy mental images 
Participants. I planned to recruit at least 260 participants using TurkPrime (Litman et al., 
2017) (see preregistration at https://aspredicted.org/xp2ey.pdf). Between December 28th, 2016 
and December 29th, 2016, I sampled participants until I had recruited approximately equal 
numbers between conditions and N ≥ 260. Participants opened our survey 350 times, and I paid 
$0.50 to all 290 who submitted their MTurk HIT assignments (82.86% submission rate). See 
Table 3 for pertinent sample characteristics.  
Statistical power. Our final sample (N = 272) afforded us 80% power to detect Cohen’s 
d = 0.34 between two independent samples (power.t.test function in the stats package in R; R 
Core Team, 2019), an effect size near the estimated median in intergroup processes research 
(Lovakov & Agadullina, 2017). 
Procedure. I randomly assigned participants (the “raters”) to rate either the Germy 
classification image (n = 135) or the anti-Germy classification image (n = 137). Participants also 
rated additional classification images created to test individual difference effects (see 
supplemental repository). Following consent, participants used a 9-point scale to rate each face 
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on clarity (i.e., “How clear is this image?”), from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Extremely). This was meant 
to familiarize participants with the images (Dotsch et al., 2008, Study 1). Next, participants 
completed the subjective feature dimension rating portion of the study. Participants read 
definitions for nine feature dimensions they would use to rate the classification images: germy, 
disfigured, heavy, old, foreign, violent, arrogant, incompetent, and trustworthy. Participants were 
asked to confirm in a textbox at the bottom of the survey page that they read and understood the 
definitions. To reduce the number of items per screen, participants rated each classification 
image by itself on groups of four or five features at a time. Participants rated feature dimensions 
using the same 9-point scale they used for clarity ratings. Participants then used the same scale to 
report their intentions to interact with the person represented in each classification image: “If you 
were to meet in real life, how much would you want to avoid physical contact with this person?” 
and “If you were to meet in real life, how willing would you be to stand near this person?” In this 
way, participants first rated feature dimensions of each image, and then they reported their 
intentions to interact with the represented people. Finally, participants answered demographic 
questions, reported what they thought was the purpose of the study, and saw a short debriefing. 
Results 
Analysis plan. To test whether the Germy representation appeared to have stronger 
infection-related features than infection-unrelated features, I compared all pairwise feature mean 
ratings of only the Germy representation, correcting for multiple tests using a Bonferroni p-value 
adjustment (Maxwell, 1980). 
To compare the non-Germy and Germy mental images on the variety of feature 
dimensions described above, I conducted a canonical discriminant analysis using the candisc 
function in the candisc package in R (Friendly & Fox, 2020), and I supplemented this analysis 
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with univariate analyses. Specifically, I used the discriminant procedure to compute a linear 
combination of weights that—when applied to our observed feature dimensions ratings—
maximally distinguishes the non-Germy and Germy mental images. Conceptually, this allows us 
to distinguish the non-Germy and Germy mental images via a multivariate combination of 
feature dimensions—essentially a profile of features—rather than via each feature dimension by 
itself (i.e., ignoring correlations between features). Importantly, this procedure closely 
corresponds to a readily interpretable multivariate effect size, Mahalanobis’s distance (D), which 
combines information from univariate effect sizes and correlations among the measures to index 
the standardized difference between two groups along the discriminant axis. Mahalanobis’s D 
enjoys the same substantive interpretation as the widely used Cohen’s d. Also, like Cohen’s d, 
Mahalanobis’s D can be converted to an overlap coefficient (e.g., d = 0.85 corresponds to 50% 
overlap between two univariate normal distributions). Researchers have used Mahalanobis’s D to 
supplement standard univariate effect size analyses when testing gender differences in Big Five 
personality factors and facets (Del Giudice et al., 2012) as well as in implicit personality traits 
(Vianello et al., 2013). To address interpretation issues due to heterogeneity, I used a 
heterogeneity coefficient—the equivalent proportion of variables coefficient (EPV)—to help 
estimate whether only one or a few feature dimensions (i.e., small EPV coefficients) 
disproportionally account for observed multivariate differences between groups (Del Giudice, 
2017). 
 Last, to test avoidance intentions (e.g., whether raters wanted to avoid the Germy 
representations more than the non-Germy representations), I conducted Welch’s t-tests on the 
“want to avoid” and “willing to stand-near” items. In sum, I used a combination of canonical 
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discriminant analysis, univariate, and multivariate effect sizes to uncover the differences between 
non-Germy and Germy mental images. 
Do Germy persons appear to have stronger infection-related features than less 
infection-related features? Comparing mean feature ratings within the Germy representation, I 
do not find sufficient evidence that the Germy representation appears to have stronger infection-
related features than less infection-related features (top right plot of Figure 8; see supplement for 
pairwise tests). 
Do people discriminate between non-Germy and Germy mental images? Using 
canonical discriminant analyses, I found that the nine feature dimensions combined well to 
maximally discriminate between the non-Germy and Germy mental images (cross-validated 
classification accuracy3: 78%, 95% CI [72%, 83%]), Canonical R2 = .28, F(9, 270) = 11.57, p < 
.001 (see Figure 12A). Along the single feature dimensions, raters judged the Germy mental 
image to be significantly more germy (d = 0.39), more disfigured (d = 0.82), heavier (d = 0.63), 
older (d = 0.80), more foreign (d = 0.70), more violent (d = 0.31), more incompetent (d = 0.34), 
and less trustworthy (d = -0.51) than the non-Germy mental image (see Figure 12B). Raters did 
not judge Germy representations to be significantly more arrogant than non-Germy 
representations (d = -0.01). When considering these feature dimension differences and their 
correlations together, I observed Mahalanobis’s D = 1.25, 95% CI [0.94, 1.42], which 
corresponds to 36.35% overlap (assuming multivariate normality). In other words, subjective 
 
3 We used a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure to fit a linear discriminant model (MASS R package, 
Venables & Ripley, 2002), and we used the posterior probabilities from that model (higher score = higher 
probability the participant rated a Germy representation) to calculate the area under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve (AUROC) (pROC R package, Robin et al., 2011), the “classification accuracy” value we report 
here and throughout this paper. Higher AUROC values indicate the model is better at distinguishing a Germy face 
from a non-Germy face. We computed confidence intervals around AUROC via a boostrapping procedure (2,000 
stratified resamples). 
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perceptions of the non-Germy and Germy representations do not overlap much (less than 50%), 
suggesting that people do form relatively distinct Germy representations. Importantly, I observed 
some heterogeneity: The equivalent proportion of variables coefficient (EPV) suggests 51% 
(about 5) of the feature dimension ratings contribute equally to the multivariate effect, D. 
Specifically, it seems that perceptions of disfigurement, heaviness, age, and foreignness—the 
dimensions associated with the largest partial correlations—contributed most strongly to 
configural differences in non-Germy and Germy mental images. 
 
Figure 12. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Together, the panels depict the maximal, configural difference 
between the non-Germy and Germy classification images (Panel A) and the relative contribution of each rating to that difference 
(Panel B) (Study 3). The canonical scores represent participant ratings transformed to maximize the difference in the canonical 
variable between the non-Germy and Germy conditions. Higher scores indicate a more Germy blend, and lower scores indicate a 
more non-Germy blend. Panel A depicts a combination of boxplots and violin plots that visualize representation canonical 
scores. Panel B depicts the direction and magnitude of partial (i.e., condition-adjusted) correlations between the individual 
feature dimension ratings and the canonical scores. Higher scores index the contribution of each feature dimension to the non-
Germy/Germy differences. 
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Do people want to avoid Germy persons more than non-Germy persons? Raters 
reported wanting to avoid the person in the Germy mental image more, MDifference = 0.89, 95% CI 
[0.35, 1.44], t(276.53) = 3.21, p = .001, and they reported being willing to stand near the person 
in the Germy mental image less, MDifference = -0.51, 95% CI [-1.00, -0.02], t(278) = 2.07, p = .040, 
than the person in the non-Germy representation. 
Discussion 
In Study 3, participants generated mental images of Germy people through a reverse 
correlation image classification task. Importantly, the reverse correlation task is a data-driven 
method that limited participant’s ability to edit their mental images in line with what they expect 
a Germy person to look like. Given this constraint on participants, do their estimated 
representations still appear threat-specific like those representations generated via expectation-
driven methods used in Studies 1 and 2?  
An independent sample of participants rated classification images on a variety of feature 
dimensions. Examining only the Germy representation, I did not find sufficient evidence that the 
Germy representation appeared to have stronger infection-related features than less infection-
related features. However, when making multidimensional comparisons between face types, 
people did strongly distinguish between the Germy and non-Germy representations; 
disfigurement, heaviness, age, and foreignness ratings contributed most strongly to configural 
differences. The Germy representations also appeared more violent than the non-Germy 
representations, even though violent appearance is not a direct infection indicator. Last, the 
Germy representation appeared like someone people would want to avoid contact with, a 
motivation likely to reduce the threat posed by real infected people. Taken together, although the 
Germy representation appears to have threat-specific facial features that have been studied in the 
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pathogen avoidance literature, the Germy representation also appears to have a number of 
infection-unrelated negative features; thus, these ratings data are more consistent with the threat-
combination hypothesis—a pattern different from that uncovered through expectation-driven 
methods in Studies 1 and 2.  
Study 4 
 In Study 3, participants held a Germy mental image that—when compared to a non-
Germy image—appeared to have many features associated with infectious disease but that also 
appeared violent, a trait that, at best, is only indirectly linked to infectious disease. One 
possibility is that these feature differences could simply be an artifact of comparing classification 
images to anti-classification images, which are mathematically opposite images (i.e., dark pixels 
in one image are light pixels in the other). However, this artifact explanation need not be true: 
Previous research on this reverse correlation image task suggests anti-classification images can 
be psychologically meaningful (e.g., submissive representations appear similar to anti-dominant 
representations, (Dotsch & Todorov, 2012a). Another possibility is that the label used to 
represent infection threat during the reverse correlation image classification task (“Germy”) was 
imprecise, allowing participants to apply a variety of meanings during the image selection phase. 
 Given these possibilities, I made two key changes in Study 4. First, I replaced the Germy 
label with “Infected.” Though similar to Germy, Infected unambiguously represents our social 
category of interest. Second, participants were assigned to choose faces representing either an 
Infected category or a Healthy category. By comparing representations for Infected and Healthy, 
rather than Infected and a composite of unchosen images (i.e., non-Infected), I can evaluate 
whether the differences found in Study 3 were merely procedural artifacts. If meaningful 
differences emerge between these categories, their pattern can be used to contrast the threat-
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combination hypothesis and the threat-specific feature hypothesis. All other aspects of the study 
design followed those used in Study 3. 
Method 
Phase 1: Estimating mental images of Healthy and Infected persons 
Participants. I recruited undergraduate psychology student participants between January 
22nd, 2018 and March 12th, 2018 (see preregistration at https://osf.io/9t4pr). I tabled pertinent 
sample characteristics in Table 3. I randomly assigned these participants to either a Healthy (n = 
103) or an Infected condition (n = 102). 
Statistical power. The condition with the smallest sample size (n = 102) afforded 80% 
power to detect Pearson’s r = .27 (pwr.r.test function in the pwr package in R; Champely, 2018). 
Procedure. For the reverse correlation task, I first generated 400 new pairs of stimuli 
(i.e., new random noise patterns) using the rcicr package in R (Dotsch, 2016). I used the same 
base face and procedure I used in Study 3 with one design modification: Before starting the task, 
participants read instructions which included a definition of their randomly-assigned target 
category: (1) Healthy, “having or showing good health; not sick or injured; the condition of 
being well or free from infectious disease, ” or (2) Infected, “affected or contaminated (a person, 
organ, wound, etc.) with disease-producing germs or pathogens; capable of causing infection in 
other people.” Participants confirmed with a research assistant that they understood the 
definition. Then they completed a practice trial and confirmed again that they understood before 
starting the task. After completing the task, participants answered three trait-level threat concern 
questionnaires, answered demographic questions, and reported what they thought was the 
purpose of the study. 
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Generating classification images. Using rcicr as in Study 3, I created classification 
images and anti-classification images for participants’ mental images of Infected and Healthy 
(see Figure 13). In total, I created one Infected classification image and one Healthy 
classification image as well as one Infected anti-classification image and one Healthy anti-
classification image. 
 
Figure 13. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Images depict the non-Infected, Infected, non-Healthy, and Healthy 
classification images (Study 4). 
 
Phase 2: Measuring features of Infected and Healthy mental images 
Participants. I planned to recruit 444 MTurkers using TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017) so 
I might collect a final N = 400 if 10% of participants failed to meet inclusion criteria (see 
preregistration at https://osf.io/uy4dm). Between March 24th, 2018 and March 25th, 2018, I 
sampled participants until I had recruited approximately equal numbers of MTurkers among four 
conditions and N ≥ 400. Participants opened our survey 555 times and I paid $0.75 to all 464 
(83.60% completion rate) participants who submitted their MTurk HIT assignments (see Table 3 
for pertinent sample characteristics). I randomly assigned these participants to rate either the 
Healthy anti-classification image (n = 106), the Healthy classification image (n = 96), the 
Infected anti-classification image (n = 106), or the Infected classification image (n = 114). As in 
Study 3, participants also rated additional images assessing individual difference effects (see 
supplemental file). 
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Statistical power. Our power analyses reflect our preregistration in which I planned tests 
for all four conditions. Our final sample (N = 414) afforded us 80% power to detect Cohen’s d = 
0.27 for main effects (e.g., all Healthy conditions vs. all Infected conditions) and interactions and 
d = 0.39 for two-cell contrasts (power.t.test function in the stats package in R; R Core Team, 
2019), effect sizes near the estimated median in intergroup processes research (Lovakov & 
Agadullina, 2017). 
Procedure. Procedures mirrored Phase 2 in Study 3 except participants rated mental 
images using an expanded set of 12 subjective feature dimensions that included more infectious 
disease threat and non-infectious disease threat dimensions: germy, disfigured, old, heavy, 
foreign, fatigued, healthy, violent, angry, dominant, muscular, and masculine. 
Results 
Analysis plan. Our analysis plan mirrored our plan from Phase 2 of Study 3. 
Do Infected persons appear to have stronger infection-related features than less infection-related 
features? Similar to Study 3, comparing mean feature ratings within the Infected representation, I 
do not find sufficient evidence that the Infected representation appeared to have stronger 
infection-related features than less infection-related features (bottom left plot of Figure 8; see 
supplement for pairwise tests). 
Do people discriminate between Healthy and Infected mental images? Using 
canonical discriminant analyses, I found that the twelve feature dimensions combined well to 
maximally discriminate between the Healthy and Infected mental images (cross-validated 
classification accuracy: 85%, 95% CI [79%, 89%]), Canonical R2 = .43, F(12, 197) = 12.22, p < 
.001 (see Figure 14A). Specifically, raters judged the Infected mental image to be more germy (d 
= 0.81), more disfigured (d = 0.47), older (d = 0.85), heavier (d = 1.01), more foreign (d = 0.38), 
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more fatigued (d = 1.06), less healthy (d = -0.98), more violent (d = 0.68), and angrier (d = 0.84) 
than the Healthy mental image (see Figure 14B). Raters did not significantly distinguish the 
Infected representation from the Healthy representation on dominance (d = -0.06), muscularity (d 
= -0.06), or masculinity (d = -0.21). When considering these feature ratings differences and their 
correlations together, I observed Mahalanobis’s D = 1.74, 95% CI [1.30, 1.95], which 
corresponds to 23.85% overlap (assuming multivariate normality). Importantly, I observed some 
heterogeneity: The equivalent proportion of variables coefficient (EPV) suggests 45.48% (about 
5) of the feature dimensions contribute equally to the multivariate effect, D. Specifically, it 
seems that perceptions of germiness, heaviness, age, fatigue, health, violence, and anger 
contributed most strongly to configural differences in Healthy and Infected mental images. 
 
Figure 14. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Together, the panels depict the maximal, configural difference 
between the Healthy and Infected classification images (Panel A) and the relative contribution of each rating to that difference 
(Panel B) (Study 4). The canonical scores represent participant ratings transformed to maximize the difference in the canonical 
variable between the Healthy and Infected conditions. Higher scores indicate a more Infected blend, and lower scores indicate a 
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more Healthy blend. Panel A depicts a combination of boxplots and violin plots that visualize representation canonical scores. 
Panel B depicts the direction and magnitude of partial (i.e., condition-adjusted) correlations between the individual feature 
dimension ratings and the canonical scores. Higher scores index the contribution of each feature dimension to the 
Healthy/Infected differences. 
 
Do people want to avoid Infected persons more than Healthy persons? Raters 
reported wanting to avoid the person in the Infected mental image more, MDifference = 0.91, 95% 
CI [0.24, 1.57], t(201.82) = 2.68, p = .008, and they reported being willing to stand near the 
person in the Infected mental image less, MDifference = -1.00, 95% CI [-1.60, -0.40], t(199.39) = 
3.27, p = .001, than the person in the Healthy representation. Thus, like Study 3, Study 4 raters 
wanted to avoid Infected people more than Healthy people. 
Discussion 
In Study 4, participants generated mental images of either Healthy or Infected people. An 
independent sample of participants rated these on a variety of features. Examining only the 
Infected representation, I did not find sufficient evidence that the Infected representation 
appeared to have stronger infection-related features than less infection-related features. However, 
when making multidimensional comparisons between face types, people did strongly distinguish 
between the Infected and Healthy representations; germiness, heaviness, age, fatigue, health, 
violence, and anger contributed most strongly to configural differences. Also, as in Study 3, the 
Infected representation appeared like someone people would want to avoid contact with. In sum, 
Infected representations had similar mean ratings across negative features, and Infected 
representations were judged to be more extreme than Healthy representations on both disease 
threat-specific features as well as on features not directly linked to infectious disease (violence 
and anger). Thus, as in Study 3, these ratings data are more consistent with the threat-
combination hypothesis. 
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Notably, findings from the Infected category in Study 4 were consistent with those from 
the Germy category in Study 3 in that participants distinguished these composites from their 
respective comparison categories (non-Germy and Healthy) on the same feature dimensions of 
germiness, disfigurement, foreignness, heaviness, age, and violence. These data suggest that 
Infected representations largely overlap with Germy representations (and Healthy with non-
Germy representations), and they are inconsistent with the interpretation that the Study 3 results 
were an artifact of comparing anti-classification images to classification images. This 
interpretation is further supported by objective correlations among the pixel luminance values in 
the images themselves: The Study 3 Germy composite strongly, positively correlated with the 
Study 1B Infected composite (r = .60) and strongly, negatively correlated with the Healthy 
composite (r = -.58), even though all 3 composites were generated in independent reverse 
correlation image classification tasks. 
Study 5 
 So far, data-driven mental images from Studies 3 and 4 indicate that mental images of 
infected people include features previously linked to infectious disease threat as well as some 
features not directly associated with this threat. These data-driven representations appear to more 
strongly support the threat-combination hypothesis over the threat-specific hypothesis, unlike 
images generated through expectation-driven methods. Though data-driven representations may 
include a combination of threatening features, it is also possible that threat-specificity emerges 
more clearly when contrasting representations linked to different types of threats. For example, it 
may be that representations of infected persons appear more germy but less aggressive than 
representations of violent persons. Such representations may possess unique patterns of cues 
indicating that these people pose qualitatively different threats. 
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To examine this possibility, in Study 5 participants chose faces best matching either 
Germy or Violent categories. “Germy” represents a person who poses an infectious disease threat 
(as in earlier Studies), and “Violent” represents a person who poses a physical harm threat. I then 
compared classification images between these two categories, as in Study 4. All other aspects of 
the study design followed those used in prior studies.  
Method 
Phase 1: Estimating mental images of Violent and Germy persons 
Participants. I planned to recruit 200 participants (n = 100 for each target category) 
using TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017) (see preregistration at https://aspredicted.org/wa5mj.pdf). 
Between February 9th, 2017 and February 10th, 2017, I recruited participants until I had 
approximately equal numbers of participants between conditions and N ≥ 200. Participants 
opened our survey 398 times and I paid $2.00 to all 244 (61.46% completion rate) participants 
who submitted their MTurk HIT assignments (see pertinent sample characteristics in Table 3). I 
randomly assigned these participants to a Violent (n = 102) or Germy (n = 98) condition. 
Statistical power. The condition with the smallest sample size (n = 98) afforded 80% power to 
detect Pearson’s r = .27 (pwr.r.test function in the pwr package in R; Champely, 2018). 
Procedure. For the reverse correlation task, I used the same base face and noise patterns 
generated for Study 3. Like our procedure in Study 4, participants read instructions which 
included a definition of their randomly-assigned target category: (1) Violent, “prone to commit 
acts of violence; uses physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something,” or 
(2) Germy, “full of germs; germ infested; appearing either sick or contaminated.” Next, they 
completed a practice trial. Before moving onto the task, participants saw their target definition 
again above a reminder describing which keys correspond to selecting the image on the left or 
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right during each trial. After completing the reverse correlation image classification task, 
students completed three trait-level threat concern questionnaires, reported what they thought 
was the purpose of the study, and saw a short debriefing page. 
Generating classification images. Using rcicr, I created classification images and anti-
classification images for chooser participants’ mental images of Violent and Germy (see Figure 
15). In total, I created one Violent and one Germy classification image as well as one Violent 
anti-classification image and one Germy anti-classification image. As in Study 4, I only report 
analyses on classification images. 
 
Figure 15. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Images depict non-Germy (top left), Germy (top right), non-Violent 
(bottom left), and Violent (bottom right) classification images (Study 5). 
 
Phase 2: Measuring feature dimensions of Violent and Germy mental images 
Participants. I planned to recruit 500 MTurkers using TurkPrime (Litman et al., 2017) 
(see preregistration at https://aspredicted.org/q6wv2.pdf). Between June 13th, 2017 and June 
20th, 2017, I sampled participants until I had recruited approximately equal numbers of 
MTurkers among four conditions and N ≥ 500. Participants opened our survey 726 times and I 
paid $0.75 to all 542 (74.66% completion rate) participants who submitted their MTurk HIT 
assignments; 505/542 (93.17%) met our inclusion criteria (see Table 3 for pertinent sample 
characteristics). I randomly assigned these participants to rate a Violent anti-classification image 
(n = 124), a Violent classification image (n = 127), a Germy anti-classification image (n = 129), 
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or a Germy classification image (n = 126). As in Studies 3 and 4, participants also rated 
additional images assessing individual difference effects (see supplement). 
Statistical power. Our final sample (N = 505) afforded us 80% power to detect Cohen’s d = 0.25 
for main effects and interactions and d = 0.35 for two-cell contrasts (power.t.test function in the 
stats package in R; (R Core Team, 2019), effect sizes near the estimated median in intergroup 
processes research (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2017). 
Procedure. Procedures mirrored those from Phase 2 in Study 4. 
Results 
Analysis plan. Our analysis plan mirrored our plans from Phase 2 of Studies 3 and 4. 
Do Germy persons appear to have stronger infection-related features than less 
infection-related features? As in earlier studies, comparing mean feature ratings within the 
Germy representation, I do not find sufficient evidence that the Germy representation appears to 
have stronger infection-related features than less infection-related features (bottom right plot of 
Figure 8; see supplement for pairwise tests). 
Do people discriminate between Violent and Germy mental images? Using canonical 
discriminant analyses, I found that the twelve subjective feature dimensions combined well to 
maximally discriminate between the Violent and Germy mental images (cross-validated 
classification accuracy: 72%, 95% CI [65%, 77%]), Canonical R2 = .22, F(12, 240) = 5.60, p < 
.001 (see Figure 16A). Specifically, raters judged the Germy mental image to be less old (d = -
0.28), less foreign (d = -0.72), less violent (d = -0.59), less angry (d = -0.68), less dominant (d = 
0.60), less muscular (d = -0.50), and less masculine (d = -0.34) than the Violent mental image 
(see Figure 16B). Raters did not judge the Germy representation as significantly more germy (d 
= -0.09), disfigured (d = -0.12), heavy (d = -0.23), fatigued (d = 0.21), or healthy (d = -0.14) than 
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the Violent representation. When considering these trait differences and their correlations 
together, I observed Mahalanobis’s D = 1.05, 95% CI [0.77, 1.20], which corresponds to 42.70% 
overlap (assuming multivariate normality). Importantly, I observed some heterogeneity: The 
equivalent proportion of variables coefficient (EPV) suggests 36.61% (about 4) of the feature 
dimensions contribute equally to the multivariate effect, D. Specifically, it seems that 
perceptions of foreignness, violence, anger, and dominance contributed most strongly to 
configural differences in Violent and Germy mental images. 
 
Figure 16. Reprinted from Michalak and Ackerman (2020). Together, the panels depict the maximal, configural difference 
between the Violent and Germy classification images (Panel A) and the relative contribution of each rating to that difference 
(Panel B) (Study 5). The canonical scores represent participant ratings transformed to maximize the difference in the canonical 
variable between the Violent and Germy conditions. Higher scores indicate a more Germy blend, and lower scores indicate a 
more Violent blend. Panel A depicts a combination of boxplots and violin plots that visualize representation canonical scores. 
Panel B depicts the direction and magnitude of partial (i.e., condition-adjusted) correlations between the individual feature 
dimension ratings and the canonical scores. Higher scores index the contribution of each feature dimension to the Violent/Germy 
differences. 
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Do people want to avoid Germy persons more than Violent persons? I found no 
sufficient evidence that raters wanted to avoid the person in the Germy mental image more, 95% 
CI [-1.10, 0.10], or stand near them less, 95% CI [-0.44, 0.67], than the person in the Violent 
mental image. Thus, the composites appear to be perceived as equally threatening, in general. 
Discussion 
As in Studies 3 and 4, I found no sufficient evidence that the Germy representation 
appeared to have stronger infection-related features than infection-unrelated features. However, 
unlike Studies 3 and 4 in which I compared mental images of people associated with infectious 
disease threat to representations of people who presumably pose no threat (i.e., non-Germy, 
Healthy), in Study 5, I compared a representation of infection threat to a representation of a 
violence threat. This comparison afforded us a complementary test of our hypotheses. 
Among the subjective feature dimensions measured, perceptions of foreignness, violence, 
anger, and dominance contributed most strongly to configural differences between Violent and 
Germy mental images. These contrasts suggest Germy mental images—when compared to 
Violent mental images—appear to share many of the same disease threat-specific feature 
dimensions studied in the pathogen avoidance literature (e.g., germy, healthy, disfigured). This is 
indexed in part by lower classification accuracy by the canonical discriminant analysis (compare 
78% and 85% accuracy when distinguishing infection threat from no-threat in Studies 3 and 4 to 
72% when distinguishing infection threat from violence threat in Study 5). From the threat-
specific perspective, this pattern is surprising. Though the Germy representations do possess 
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infectious disease features4, Violent representations also possess such features. In contrast, 
Germy representations appear to pose less of a physical harm threat relative to Violent 
representations (e.g., less violent, angry, dominant). Thus, Germy representations are marked by 
infectious disease threat-specific features, but these features do not appear to be more 
pronounced than the same features in the Violent representations. Also, even though the Violent 
representation appeared to pose a stronger physical harm threat, I found no sufficient evidence 
that raters wanted to avoid such a person more than the person represented in the Germy image.  
The partial overlap between features associated with both Germy and Violent 
representations is further supported by objective correlations between their pixel luminance 
values. The Violent image correlates less strongly with the Germy image from Study 5 (r = .45) 
and Study 3 (r = .32) than the Study 5 Germy image correlates with the Infected image from 
Study 4 (r = .65) and the Germy image from Study 3 (r = .60). 
Taken together, these data suggest people represent both Germy and Violent persons with 
features from multiple specific threats, but Violent representations possess more prominent, 
physical harm threat-specific features. I interpret these patterns as being most consistent with the 
threat-combination hypothesis. 
General Discussion 
I started this research with a simple question: How do people mentally represent distinct 
interpersonal threats? I proposed two hypotheses. The threat-specificity hypothesis predicts that 
people mentally represent distinct interpersonal threats with features specific to and diagnostic of 
 
4 Whether we compare Germy representations to non-Germy representations (Study 3) or Infected to Healthy 
representations (Study 4), the infectious disease threat representation is consistently rated more germy, more 
disfigured, more fatigued, and less healthy. 
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those threats. Alternatively, the threat-combination hypothesis predicts that people mentally 
represent distinct threat categories with a combination of threat features common across multiple 
types of threats. In tests of these hypotheses using different methodological approaches, I found 
that expectation-driven approaches—those privileging participant beliefs, stereotypes, and 
intuitions—revealed strong evidence of threat-specificity. In contrast, data-driven approaches—
those constraining top-down processes—revealed evidence more consistent with the threat-
combination hypothesis. For example, participants who listed traits or drew images of their 
representations associated infection threat with infection-specific features and violence threat 
with aggression-specific features. But when participants produced mental images through the 
reverse correlation task, both threat representations included infection- and violence-relevant 
features (though the magnitude of these features differed across categories). These patterns 
suggest two key takeaways: (1) consistent with a functional perspective, threat-specificity 
emerges in representations most strongly when perceivers can control the content of their 
responses through editing, stereotype application, and so on, and (2) method matters. 
Implications 
The patterns uncovered here have implications for our understanding of pathogen 
avoidance psychology as well as threat management more generally. Research on how people 
process and react to others in the context of pathogen threat has commonly focused on a small 
set of cues that elicit negative interpersonal responses, such as unfamiliarity (e.g., foreignness, 
outgroupness; (Aarøe et al., 2017; Faulkner et al., 2004) and aspects of physical appearance (e.g., 
obesity, age, unattractiveness; Duncan & Schaller, 2009; Park et al., 2007; Tybur & Gangestad, 
2011). The study of such cues is premised on functional perspectives that emphasize the specific 
costs and consequences of infection relative to other types of threat (Neuberg et al., 2011). 
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Additionally, many of these research findings stem from participant reactions to researcher-
selected threat cues. Yet, our findings suggest that mental images of infected persons generated 
through data-driven methods include features that are not specific to pathogen threat (e.g., 
anger). Such results suggest that approaches drawing on functional (and other) perspectives 
could benefit from use of more diverse methods. The fact that representations were more distinct 
when responses were unconstrained indicates participants expect threat-specificity much like 
functional threat management researchers often do. An implication is that research that focuses 
too narrowly on threat-specific cues may overlook the complex ways in which people represent 
and understand these hazards.  
This social cognitive and perceptual approach to infection threat also raises questions 
about the downstream consequences of holding mixed-threat mental representations. For 
instance, perceivers may draw negative inferences about others displaying cues associated with 
infection not only because perceivers anticipate the potential for infection but also because they 
infer the potential for other harms. Such inferences could influence the stereotypes perceivers 
apply (e.g., broadly negative), attributions they make (e.g., difficult, hostile), and behavioral 
responses (e.g., avoid) to these people. Outside the lab, these threat management processes could 
affect how sick people (and those merely resembling sick people) are treated. 
Last, our findings speak to how people measure and conceptualize mental representations 
of other social categories. Researchers study social categories using a variety of methods, 
including the methods used here. However, they do not always explicitly consider whether 
different methods can privilege different psychological processes, thereby affecting their 
conclusions about how people represent social categories. Given I found participants emphasize 
different features in their mental representations depending on their task, it is possible that 
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mental representations of other social categories (including ones not associated with threat) 
might “look” different depending on the methods researchers use to estimate them. Perhaps the 
best solution to this challenge is the use of multiple methods whose strengths compensate for the 
limitations of other methods, providing a more holistic view on representations.  
Limitations and future directions 
The methods I employed here have many strengths such as the fact participants 
themselves constructed interpersonal threat representations rather than merely responding to 
representations provided by researchers. And the use of both expectation-driven and data-driven 
methods allows us to evaluate the influence of top-down processes on the generation of mental 
representations. However, these methods are limited in certain ways.  
First, the reverse correlation image classification task entails trade-offs in process and 
final image generation. During this task, participants make all their selections first, and then 
researchers use software to average those selections. This average serves as a proxy mental 
image. Because participants do not see this mental image emerge as they make selections, they 
cannot adjust their representation as they see fit over the course of the task. Some may view this 
task feature as a limitation because mental representations emerge dynamically and draw from 
multiple sources of information in the mind, including salient stereotypes (Carlston & Smith, 
1996; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Sherman, 1996; Wyer, 2007). In our case, I found it useful to 
compare representations with and without this constraint feature. 
Perhaps more importantly, reverse correlation classification images are created by 
averaging pixel patterns. Averaging is likely to obscure asymmetrical features that are 
hypothesized to reflect lower immunocompetence and, therefore, greater infection risk (Thornhill 
& Gangestad, 2006). Averaging pixel patterns may also blur random variations that represent 
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skin blotches, sores, or other skin anomalies associated with infectious disease. Does this issue 
invalidate the use of the reverse correlation task for estimating mental images of infected others? 
Not necessarily. Consider the responses given when participants used an expectation-driven 
procedure in Study 1. Participants listed features such as drowsy eyes, tired, weak, and sick, all 
of which can be perceived in principle (and qualitatively) in the composite images from Studies 
3-4. High-level features like these emerge from specific patterns of eye, mouth, and eyebrow 
configurations, and the reverse correlation task is well suited to recovering such features. Thus, 
although this task cannot generate representations with certain features, our finding that the 
images generated from this task differed from images generated by methods like active drawing 
need not imply a methodological problem. This difference simply highlights that expectation-
driven methods can limit our understanding of people’s representations. 
An additional concern about the reverse correlation task is that participants could simply 
select whichever images they perceived more negatively rather than selecting the images they 
perceived as more infected or violent per se. If so, the final classification images are averages of 
negative features rather than threat-specific features. I propose the data suggest otherwise. A 
negative feature choice rule should produce classification images with negative traits in roughly 
equal magnitude within and between threat representations. This was not the case. Within the 
germy/infected category, mental images included statistically distinguishable feature differences 
(not all negative traits were the same). The pattern of ratings and their correlations strongly 
distinguished the infected and violent representations, even though both categories appeared 
negative along many dimensions. In addition, certain feature ratings more strongly contributed to 
differences between categories (e.g., fatigue and healthy, Study 4), and the pixel luminance 
values of the germy and infected composites were more strongly correlated with each other than 
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with the violent images, across studies. Thus, rather than generate indiscriminately negative 
images, participants generated images with distinct patterns of negative features.   
Although the expectation-driven methods used in Studies 1 and 2 may appear less limited 
than the reverse correlation task, they too have certain limitations. I detailed a primary one 
earlier—expectation-driven methods allow participants to edit their representations, which may 
look very different compared to their spontaneous representation. In addition, expectation-driven 
methods are susceptible to social desirability bias. For example, participants may associate a 
specific group with infection or germs but craft an image that does not reveal this association to 
researchers. 
Future research might overcome the limitations of both the reverse correlation image 
classification task and the drawing method by using a task that provides on-the-fly representation 
updating by dynamically constructing a composite after each participant face choice and 
allowing participants to view this composite prior to the next face choice. In this way, a variety 
of hypothesized asymmetries (Thornhill & Gangestad, 2006) and skin anomalies could emerge in 
representations rather than blend together in a final average image. I are not aware of such a task, 
but I expect that this would be valuable to researchers interested in studying such cues. 
Other limitations of our methods stem from stimuli-specific design decisions. Following 
early research on the reverse correlation image classification task (e.g., Dotsch et al., 2008, I 
used a grayscale base image that averages over a variety of White men making neutral 
expressions (Lundqvist et al., 1998). Thus, participants in our studies could not generate mental 
images of germy, infected, or violent people who were non-white, female, or in color. Each of 
these choices produces limitations that could be addressed in future research. One might expect 
that associations between certain demographic categories and threats produce somewhat different 
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mental representations than those found here. For instance, do some perceivers represent infected 
people with male features more than female features (as many infectious diseases are more 
prevalent in men; van Lunzen & Altfeld, 2014)? Are perceivers more likely to include other 
types of threat features in their representations of infection when faces depict groups 
stereotypically associated with certain threats (e.g., Black men are often stereotyped as 
aggressive in the United States; (Devine, 1989; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003)? 
The use of color images in the reverse correlation task is a particularly interesting avenue 
for future work. Although greyscale base images are standard in the literature (Lundqvist et al., 
1998), mental representations of infected people may commonly include color cues. For 
example, infected person representations may contain red pox or yellow-tinged skin or eyes (i.e., 
jaundice). Future research could allow reverse correlation stimuli to vary along relevant color 
dimensions or test questions about how people mentally represent color in infected others. 
Toward this goal, Gill et al., (2015) are developing a task that incorporates color using a “Bubble 
Warp” approach, using random, colored image fragments rather than greyscale faces overlaid 
with random noise (Gosselin & Schyns, 2001). Including color in the face could make a 
meaningful difference in healthy and infected appearance, and such color deviations (e.g., pale 
skin, red skin patches) could even help distinguish an infected representation from another threat 
category. 
Conclusion 
Over the course of human history, a variety of interpersonal threats like communicable 
diseases and interpersonal violence have posed strong selection pressures that favored the 
development of psychological systems that help people identify and ultimately reduce these 
threats. In this research, I examined whether the same cues that prior research has shown people 
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associate with infection and violence threats emerge in their mental representations of those 
threats. I found evidence that threat-specific cues do characterize these representations, but this 
was primarily true when the mental representation task allowed participants to deliberate on and 
edit their representations, privileging their expectations. In contrast, when a data-driven reverse 
correlation task constrained the influence of such expectations, mental images appeared 
distinguishable but with combinations of cues common across multiple distinct threat categories. 
Thus, the methods we employ to measure types of mental representations may shape the 
conclusions we draw about those representations. A multi-method approach may be our best 
option for fully capturing how people represent threat in their mind’s eye. 
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Chapter IV. Discussion 
 Humans have been battling harmful pathogens for a long time, long enough to have 
developed sophisticated physical, psychological, and behavioral defenses against them. The 
physical immune system possesses remarkable machinery for identifying invading pathogens and 
eliminating them from the body, but its metabolic costs are too high to rely on it as the only 
defense mechanism. Humans have likely evolved another line of defense to reduce such costs: a 
behavioral immune system capable of identifying and avoiding pathogen infections in the first 
place. In chapter one, I laid out an evolutionary argument for the behavioral immune system as 
well as empirical evidence for one of its main hypotheses: the over-perception hypothesis. That 
is, given uncertainty inherent in identifying infection risks from imperfect cues and asymmetric 
costs in identification errors (i.e., false negatives are probably more costly), the behavioral 
immune system evolved a functional bias toward false positive errors: perceiving infection in 
objectively non-infectious cues. In chapters two and three, I investigated potential social 
perception mechanisms of the behavioral immune system that expand on this over-perception 
hypothesis. 
 In chapter two, I introduced the idea of proper and actual domains of the behavioral 
immune system. To review, researchers argue that functional mental modules like the behavioral 
immune system possess specialized functions with restricted inputs. Theoretically, the behavioral 
immune system evolved to process cues that correlate with infection—its proper domain of 
inputs (e.g., rashes, pustules, swelling). Given the design of its perceptual mechanisms, the 
behavioral immune system is capable of processing cues that share perceptual features with true 
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infection indicators (e.g., port-wine stain birthmarks, acne, obesity). The set comprising these 
cues and the proper domain cues constitute the actual domain. 
 In chapter two, I tested the hypothesis that people more strongly associate infection 
concepts with facial disfigurement than with obesity because facial disfigurement more closely 
resembles proper domain cues of the behavioral immune system than obesity does. I found 
support for this hypothesis across three studies that varied the nature of the comparison 
(between-subjects vs. within-subjects) and whether participants knew the facial disfigurement 
was benign. Importantly,in a fourth study,  I did not find support for an alternative hypothesis 
that people associate any negative concepts more strongly with facial disfigurement than with 
obesity (e.g., laziness). All together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that facial 
disfigurement more closely resembles a proper domain cue of the behavioral immune system 
than obesity does. 
 In chapter three, I used a variety of methods to investigate how people mentally represent 
infected others. I proposed two hypotheses for how these mental representations may appear. 
First, I proposed the threat-specificity hypothesis: people represent infected others with features 
that diagnose infection. Second, I proposed the threat-combination hypothesis: people mentally 
represent infected others with a variety of threatening features, including features that correlate 
with infection. Support for these hypotheses depended on the method I used to measure mental 
representations. The trait-listing and drawing methods yielded representations that appeared 
more consistent with the threat-specificity hypotheses, whereas the reverse correlation 
classification images yielded representations that appeared more consistent with the threat-
combination hypothesis. All together, the results are consistent with the notion that methods that 
incorporate researcher or participant expectations (e.g., infected people should only look 
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infected) are more likely to yield results in line with those expectations. It turned out that 
participants in my studies expected infected people to have infection-specific features. But when 
they could not easily edit their representation in line with their expectations during the reverse 
correlation classification task, their aggregate choices appeared to have threatening features less 
diagnostic of infection (e.g., representations appeared angry and dominant). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The research I presented in my dissertation yields insights into psychological 
mechanisms of the behavioral immune system, but the research designs I used limited the 
conclusions I could draw from the results. In chapter two, I claimed that facial rashes are a 
proper domain cue of the behavioral immune system and obesity is not, so people should more 
strongly associate infection with facial rashes and cues that resemble facial rashes than with 
obesity. Proper domain cues for the behavioral immune system should have a relatively long 
history of diagnosing infection in people. This is probably the case for facial rashes and less the 
case for obesity or even facial swelling (Wolfe et al., 2007) (though this premise needs more 
empirical support). Thus, the observed stronger association between infection concepts and facial 
disfigurement than with obesity is consistent with the hypothesis that facial disfigurement 
resembles a proper domain cue and obesity is not, or perhaps both cues resemble proper domain 
cyes but facial disfigurement resembles are more diagnostic, less noisy proper domain cue. 
However, the results are also consistent with the hypothesis that people learn associations 
between infection concepts and a variety of cues over their lifetime (i.e., cultural learning). A 
stronger test of this hypothesis would specify when during the life course humans might develop 
pathogen detection mechanisms (e.g., when they’re able to avoid potentially infected people 
themselves). People should more strongly associate infection with proper domain cues during 
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and after this developmental stage. Similarly specified evolutionary hypotheses have been 
proposed for different psychological systems, such as the development of food neophobia, 
attachment and reproductive strategies, emotion, and danger learning ((Cashdan, 1998; Clark 
Barrett et al., 2016; Del Giudice, 2009; Frankenhuis, 2019; Wright, 1991). In general, aside from 
measuring disgust sensitivity in children, researchers have not tested behavioral immune system 
hypotheses in infants or children. It remains an open question how the behavioral immune 
system develops and operates over the life course. 
 In chapter three, I claimed to have measured people’s mental representations of infected 
and violent others. In my general discussion in that chapter, I described important sampling 
characteristics that limited my findings as well as many findings in the behavioral immune 
system literature (Henrich et al., 2010). Despite that limitation, chapter three serves as a rough 
template for how behavioral immune system researchers as well as threat management 
researchers more broadly might develop mental representations as constructs. Researchers in 
these subfields develop and test a variety hypotheses about traits and motivations associated with 
categories of people: infected people, violent people, romantic partners, leaders, coalition 
members, friends, cheaters, parents, children, and so on (Boyer et al., 2015; Delton et al., 2012; 
Karremans et al., 2011; Krems & Conroy-Beam, 2020; Kurzban et al., 2001; Li et al., 2019; 
Neuberg et al., 2011; Van Vugt et al., 2008). In many cases, researchers are not necessarily 
interested in how social categories are represented but in how people think or feel about them or 
behave toward them. However, obviously, social psychological processes and behaviors depend 
on how social categories are perceived and represented, so it is worthwhile to study the 
representations themselves. How? As my research in chapter 3 demonstrates, what one concludes 
about how people perceive a social category depends on how you measure it. There’s no single 
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method in the social sciences that captures how people represent or perceive a social category. 
People may self-report their social category representations differently than they draw them and 
differently than patterns extracted from categorization tasks they complete (e.g., classification 
images from reverse correlation tasks). Researchers would benefit from developing social 
category representations with the same theoretical and exploratory rigor that they use to develop 
other constructs (Campbell, 1960; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
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Conclusion 
 In my dissertation, I investigated two broad psychological phenomena of the behavioral 
immune system: the proper domain of the behavioral immune system and mental representations 
of infected others. First, I observed initial evidence that people associate infection concepts more 
strongly with some anomalous yet benign facial features than with others, theoretically because 
the former more closely resembles cues the behavioral immune system was designed to 
process—its proper domain. Second, I used a variety of methods to measure how people 
mentally represented infected others and found that people listed traits and drew infected people 
with predominantly infection-related features (e.g., unhealthy, disfigured) but their reverse 
correlation classification images appeared with both infection-related and infection unrelated 
features (e.g., angry, dominant). These results yield novel insights into the mental mechanisms of 
the behavioral immune system. 
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